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A. BROWN*

American doctrine that our constitutions, whether of nation
or of state, constitute a basic fundamental law to which ordinary acts of legislation must bend has led many of our people, both
lay and professional, it is believed, into certain superficial and
dangerous habits of thought. A resulting apotheosis of the constitution seems to regard the barren written document as a self-suffident, exclusive, and final protector of the fundamental rights and
principles upon which ordered and righteous political society is
based. Too often we concentrate our attention on the simple question whether a proposed act is or is not constitutional. When once
the courts have held that the law in question does not transcend
constitutional provisions, our interest is apt to cease: the barriers
are down, the propriety of the law is proved, and future development proceeds in a planless manner, undisturbed by doubts and
questions. We need to go back of the words of the constitution
to ascertain the ultimate and fundamental reasons of policy which
have caused these mandates and prohibitions to be transcribed in
the written document. With this point of view it is the purpose
of this paper to consider those constitutional doctrines which
require that the function of adjudication shall be conferred only
upon the courts and to ascertain the way in which these provisions have been handled when legislation is attacked as contrary
to their mandates; to weigh the efficacy, if any, still possessed by
them; and finally to consider whether we should not plan our
future course with somewhat more regard for the fundamentals
which underlie them than has formerly been the case.
In the earlier days of the republic the machinery of government was fairly standardized and simple. The legislature, meeting
HE
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at periodical intervals, made the laws; the executive enforced them,
and the courts of the land, in the process of litigious controversy,
construed and applied them. This tripartite division of the powers
of government was considered such an essential feature of our
governmental policy that it was enshrined as one of the constitutional holy of holies in familiarly known doctrines which required
the separation and forbade the delegation of governmental powers.
But with the increase of state activity made necessary by our
developing urban and industrial civilization, these traditional institutions became inadequate.1 The legislatures sitting only at intervals and composed mainly of lay representatives of the lay body
of the state were lacking in ability and time to handle the huge
task of providing the detailed regulations which our complex
society demanded. Accordingly the phenomenon arose by which
the legislative assembly indicated the broad general policy of the
law and left to the executive the duty of giving content to that
policy and of supplying the detailed rules through which it was
made effective. 2 The development also affected the customary
courts of the land. In many instances the subject matter of the
regulation required for its administration a specialized knowledge
much more in the competence of the particularly trained and
experienced experts in the field than in that of the judges of our
customary courts, whose knowledge was necessarily much more
diffuse.' Moreover, in the minds of some the customary judicial
'See: Berle, The Expansion of American Administrative Law, (1917)

30 Harv. L. Rev. 430; Frankfurter, The Task of Administrative Law, (1927)
75 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 614; Guthrie, Presidential Address New York State
Bar Association, (1923) 46 Rep. N. Y. St. Bar Ass'n 169; Haines, Effects
of the Growth of Administrative Law, (1932) 26 Am. Pol. Sc. Rev. 875;
Hughes, The Republic after the War, (1919) 53 Am. L. Rev. 651; Pound,
The Crisis in American Law, (1926) 10 J. Am. Jud. Soc. 5; Pound, Organization of Courts, (1927) 11 J. Am. Jud. Soc. 69, being the republication of
an address delivered in 1913; Rosenberry, Administrative Law and the
Constitution, (1929) 23 Am. Pol. Sc. Rev. 32.
2The subject of the delegation of legislative power has received much
consideration from courts and legal writers and need not be gone into here.
The sad plight of the supposed constitutional prohibition can be gathered
from the statement of the Hon. Elihu Root that "the old doctrine forbidding
the delegation of legislative power has virtually retired from the field and
given up the fight." (1916) 41 Rep. Am. Bar Ass'n 355, 368. Professor
Cheadle is perhaps right in saying that the only question confronting the
courts is "what is reasonably necessary in view of what the times demand
and of the end to be accomplished." Cheadle, The Delegation of the Legislative Function, (1918) 27 Yale L. J.892, 920. See also the thorough and
realistic opinion in State ex rel. Wisconsin Inspection Bureau v. Whitman,
(1928) 196 Wis. 472, 220 N. W. 929.
3
The courts have often favorably commented on the expert qualifications
of administrative tribunals: "The findings of the commission (i.e., the
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procedure was too delayed, expensive, and cumbersome to satisfy
the present-day demand for a speedy and economical justice.4 The
result has been that today hosts of executive tribunals perform
functions so nearly akin to those of the courts that the only term
by which we can designate them seems to be "quasi-judicial."5
We are undoubtedly at a critical time in the growth of administrative law. The great advances now being made in governmental
control of private industry and business undoubtedly call for a
greater reliance on administrative agencies as instruments of control, and even in the traditional field of legislative and judicial
action there is an increasing demand for conferring upon administrative tribunals the functions formerly performed by legislatures
and courts.' Up to the present time, unfortunately, this system of
administrative law making and adjudication has largely, like
Interstate Commerce Commission) are made by law prima fade true. This
court has ascribed to them the strength due to the judgments of a tribunal
appointed by law and informed by experience." McKenna, J., in Ill. Central
Ry. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, (1907) 206 U. S. 441, 27 Sup. Ct.
700, 51 L. Ed. 1128. The case of McCarthy v. Sawyer Goodman Co., (1927)
194 Wis. 198, 215 N. W. 824 concerned the judicial review of a finding by
the Wisconsin Industrial Commission in a workmen's compensation case
involving an alleged traumatic inguinal hernia. The court said:
"The frequency of these cases has enabled the members of the Industrial
Commission to become thoroughly familiar with the nature, development
and progress of the ailment, and they bring to the consideration of such
cases a knowledge and experience which enables them to pass most discriminatingly upon the evidence produced. It is scarcely too much to say
that they are experts upon the subject ....
Why constitute experienced and
expert men as fact finders if their findings of fact upon expert matters are
to be overturned by courts the personnel of which have neither the knowledge nor experience of such matters enjoyed by the members of the Industrial Commission?"
4
"The recent swing of the pendulum toward administrative courts is in
part a protest against the present cumbersomeness of judicial proceedings,
of which protest the bench and bar have been too slow in taking notice."
Smith, Administrative Justice, (1923) 18 Ill. L. Rev. 211. See also Haines,
Effects of the Growth of Administrative Law, (1932) 26 Am. Pol. Sc. Rev.
875, 880; Pillsbury, Administrative Tribunals, (1923) 36 Harv. L Rev.
405, 407.
5
1n his article on Administrative Law and the Constitution, (19-9) 23

Am. Pol. Sc. Rev. 32, Chief Justice Rosenberry of the supreme court of

Wisconsin lists, at page 39, fifty-five different types of administrative tribunals exercising quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers.
6
The recommendation is made in a notable study that automobile accident litigation be removed from the courts, and committed to commissions
to administer on a compensation basis. See (1932) Report of the Committee
to Study Compensation for Automobile Accidents, to Columbia University

Council for Research in the Social Sciences. In the field of criminal law

the demand is made that executive boards of experts determine the sentence
which should be imposed upon a person found guilty by the court. See
Report National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, No. 9,
Penal Institutions, Probation, and Parole, (1931) pp. 141, 172, 238.
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Topsy, "just growed." As new needs have developed, new executive tribunals have been created to meet them. There is a brief
skirmish to determine their right to a place in our governmental
system. The issue once decided in favor of the constitutional
existence of the new tribunal, the system of administrative government presses on to new fields of conquest, with the result
that the present development is a singularly haphazard and unplanned thing, with far too little attention being paid to the principles and details of organization and procedure, which aim to
secure that proper balance between public demands and private
right, without which no governmental agency deserves to exist.7
I.
The first task at hand is to consider the types of rationalistic
weapons and devices which have been employed in resisting the
assault upon the right of administrative bodies to perform the
function of adjudication, commonly assumed to be the particular
prerogative of the regularly constituted courts of law. The attack
has commonly been along three lines: the guaranty of the right
to trial by jury; the requirement that no person shall be deprived
of life, liberty or property but by due process of law; and the
doctrine of the separation of powers, which presumably requires
that each of the three great departments of government, the legislative, the executive and the judicial, shall exercise the respective
powers conferred upon them by the constitution, and no others.
The first two of these constitutional provisions have turned out to
be but of small moment in the controversy. The federal constitution does not require the states to preserve in their system of
government the institution of jury trial.8 And as far as the state
constitutions are concerned, the restriction of the clause is largely
negatived by the holding that the requirement of jury trial relates
only to proceedings to vindicate traditional rights recognized by
the common law and not to proceedings concerning special rights
and defenses created by statute. Thus, in answer to the contention
that the right to jury trial was denied by commission administra7Bevis, Administrative Commissions and the Administration of Justice,
(1928) 2 U. of Cinn. L. Rev. 1; Root, Presidential Address before the
American Bar Association, (1916) 41 Rep. Am. Bar Ass'n 355, 369; Rosenberry, Administrative Law and the Constitution, (1929) 23 Am. Pol. Sc.
Rev. 32.
8
Walker v. Sauvinet, (1875) 92 U. S. 90, 23 L. Ed. 678; Maxwell v.
Dow, (1900) 176 U. S. 581, 20 Sup. Ct. 448, 44 L. Ed. 597.
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tion of the workmen's compensation law, the Illinois supreme
court said :9
"Our constitution provides that the right of trial by jury as
heretofore enjoyed shall remain inviolate, but it guarantees that
right only to those causes of action recognized by law. The act
here in question takes away the cause of action on the one hand
and the ground of defense on the other and merges both in a
statutory indemnity fixed and certain. If the power to do away
with a cause of action in any case exists at all in the exercise of
the police power of the State, then the right of trial by jury is
therefore no longer involved in such cases. The right of jury trial
being incidental to the right of action, to destroy the latter is to
leave the former nothing upon which to operate." 10
And as far as the due process of law clause is concerned, few
propositions are better settled than the one that this cryptic clause
does not require a judicial proceeding. If the fundamentals of a
fair hearing are preserved, the states are free to adopt whatever
tribunals and procedures they deem advisable. 1
The serious question is with the doctrine of the separation of
powers. Concerning this, one thing is apparent: the answer to the
question of whether or no there is an unconstitutional imposition
of judicial power upon an administrative body cannot be determined through the medium of definition or through any analytical
differentiation of the judicial function from that of the executive
or administrative.
9
Grand Trunk Western Ry. Co. v. Industrial Commission, (1920) -91
Ill.
167, 176, 125 N. E. 748.
'0 See also: Branch v. Indemnity Insurance Co., (19-0) 150 Md. 482,
144 Ati. 696; Cunningham v. N. W. Improvement Co., (1911) 44 Mont. 180,
119 Pac. 554; Fassig v. State ex rel. Turner, (1917) 95 Ohio St. 232,
116 N. E. 104; State ex rel. Davis-Smith Co. v. Clausen, (1911) 65 Wash.
156, 117 Pac. 1101.
""There is no provision in the federal constitution which directly or
impliedly prohibits a state under its own laws from conferring on non-judicial
bodies certain functions that may be called judicial." Peckham, J., in Consolidated Rendering Co. v. Vermont, (1908) 207 U. S.541, 28 Sup. Ct. 178,
52 L. Ed. 327. See also: Reetz v. Michigan, (1903) 188 U. S.505, 23 Sup.
Ct. 390, 47 L. Ed. 563; Gregory v. Hecke, (1925) 73 Cal. App. 268, 238
Pac. 787; Krafter v. State Board, (1913) 259 Ill.
15, 102 N. E. 193; Kennedy v. State Board, (1906) 145 Mich. 241, 108 N. W. 730. This is not to
say that administrative procedure may not be so lacking in the fundamentals
of a fair hearing as to be contrary to the requirement of due process of law.
Southern Ry. v. Virginia, (1933) 290 ,U.S.190, 54 Sup. Ct. 148, 78 L. Ed.
260. Concerning certain types of questions it has also been held that though
an administrative hearing may be had in the first instance, due process of
law requires that one of the customary courts give an independent review of
the matter. Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, (1920) 253
U. S.287, 40 Sup. Ct. 527, 64 L. Ed. 908. Cf. Crowell v. Benson, (1932)
285 U. S.22, 52 Sup. Ct. 285, 76 L. Ed. 598.
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"What is a judicial power cannot be brought within the ringfence of a definition. It is undoubtedly power to hear and determine; but this is not peculiar to the judicial office. Many of the
acts of administrative and executive officers involve the exercise
of the same power. Boards for the equalization of taxes, of public
works, of county commissioners, township trustees, judges of election, viewers of roads, all, in one form or another, hear and determine questions in the exercise of their functions, more or less
directly affecting private, as well as public rights. It may be safely
conceded that power to hear and determine rights of property and
of person between private parties is judicial, and can only be
But such a definition does not necesconferred on the courts ....
2
sarily include this case.'
The opinions of the courts teem with language of a similar
nature. Judges, when confronted with the contention that an administrative body, because it determines controverted facts, construes the law and makes decisions affecting the rights and duties
of the parties, is necessarily performing judicial functions, counter
with the declaration that, though such functions may be quasijudicial, they are not judicial in a constitutional sense; and then
proceed to justify themselves by reference to the similar functions
performed without challenge by other administrative agencies."5
12

State ex rel. Attorney-General v. Hawkins, (1886) 44 Ohio St. 98,
5 N. E. 228. In the instant case the court held that the removal of a public
officer by the governor was not an unconstitutional exercise of judicial power.
"3"While a board of county commissioners is not by the laws of this
state clothed with any judicial powers, such as are conferred upon courts,
still they are in certain instances invested with discretionary powers, which
they exercise in a quasi-judicial manner; that is, they are authorized to
investigate facts and exercise discretion or judgment in relation to the facts
revealed by such investigation in a manner similar and with similar effect as
courts .... The term 'quasi judicial' is used to describe acts, not of judicial
tribunals usually, but acts of public boards and municipal officials, presumed
to be the product or result of investigation, consideration, and human judgment, based upon evidentiary facts of some sort, in a matter within the
discretionary power of such board or officer." Hoyt v. Hughes County,
(1913) 32 S. D. 117, 142 N. W. 471, 472-3.
"In determining whether any particular place is a nuisance, the commissioner, no doubt, exercises some discretion, which, in a strict sense, is
in its nature judicial; but the executing of a police regulation quite often
calls into action that kind of discretion. And yet the acts of a commissioner
involved in this case are no more judicial than the acts of officers tinder
many other laws and ordinances which have been held valid." Los Angeles
County v. Spencer, (1899) 126 Cal. 670, 59 Pac. 202. See also Alabam's
Freight Co. v. Hunt, (1926) 29 Ariz. 419, 242 Pac. 658; Suckow v. Board
of Medical Examiners, (1920) 182 Cal. 247, 187 Pac. 965; Lanterman v.
Anderson, (1918) 36 Cal. App. 472, 172 Pac. 625; State ex rel. Hubbard
v. Holmes, (1907) 53 Fla. 226, 44 So. 179; Nash v. City of Glen Elder,
(1910) 81 Kan. 446, 106 Pac. 292; Solvuca v. Ryan & Reilly Co., (1917)
131 Md. 265, 101 Atl. 710; Ex parte Lewis, (1931) 328 Mo. 843, 42 S.W.
(2d) 21; Enterprise Irr. District v. Tri-State Land Co., (1912) 92 Neb. 121,
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This is singularly unhelpful to one who is interested in determining what functions may or may not be conferred on an administrative body. To such a searcher the vital point necessarily is not
the similarities but the differences between the functions of the
separate departments of government.
According to the nature of a particular mental act which the
official performs in making his decision, a few courts have indeed
attempted to differentiate the judicial from the administrative function. Thus it is sometimes held that an act is administrative or
ministerial rather than judicial because it lacks in discretionary
quality and calls merely for the ascertainment of facts and the
almost automatic application of the law thereto. In Ex parte
Lewis 14 the court held that the act of a health commissioner cornmifting certain diseased persons to an isolation hospital was not
judicial in character, since it did not involve "an exercise of primary or independent discretion, but only determines within defined
limits and subject to review some facts upon which the law by its
own terms operates."' 15 On the other hand, the Wisconsin court
held unconstitutional a statute giving to a securities commission,
in cases where securities had been sold contrary to the terms of
the law, power to declare the sale voidable and to make such other
award as should be "just and equitable" in the premises.
"The fact that it attempts to delegate to the commission the
power to make an award which shall be just and equitable without erecting any standard but leaving it wholly within the discretion of the commission makes it a clear delegation of judicial
power. .

.."1,6

This is certainly unsatisfactory. The character of an act
claimed to be judicial certainly cannot be determined by the ease
138 N. W. 171; In re Freeholders of Hudson County, (1928) 105 N. J. L.

57, 143 At. 536; State ex rel. Perea v. Board of Commissioners, (1919)
25 N. M. 338, 182 Pac. 865; State v. Creamer, (1912) 85 Ohio St. 349,
97 N. E. 602.
14(1931) 328 Mo. 843, 42 S. W. (2d) 21.
15See also Cunningham v. Southwestern Improvement Co., (1911) 44
Mont. 180, 119 Pac. 554; Williams v. Wedding, (1915) 165 Ky. 361, 176
S. W. 1176. The courts frequently declare that the mere finding of fact and
the application of the law thereto is an administrative, rather than a judicial,
function. Russell v. City of Fargo, (1914) 28 N. D. 300, 148 N. W. 610;
State ex rel. Abbott v. Ross, (1911) 62 Wash. 82, 113 Pac. 273.
i 6 Klein v. Barry, (1923) 182 Wis. 255, 273, 196 N. W. 457. In State v.
Bulot, (1932) 175 La. 21, 142 So. 787 the court held that a statute of
Louisiana which gave to police officers the power to disperse "unlawful"
though peaceful assemblies was an unconstitutional delegation of judicial
power since the determination of what was "unlawful" was a peculiar
prerogative of the courts.
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or difficulty of the case to be decided; and while the lack of a
proper standard for administrative action may cause the statute
to be doubted on other grounds, 17 it is a little difficult to see why
the greater discretion of the equity courts is any more sacrosanct
than the more closely confined powers of the common law
tribunals. Concerning this attempt to differentiate the judicial
function by an analysis of the nature of the mental act performed
in arriving at a decision, it has well been remarked:
"The idea of counsel for appellant seems to be that, because
the commissioners in the performance of their duties must necessarily act judicially, they must be considered, to all intents and
purposes, a court, hence an unconstitutional body because not one
contemplated by sec. 2, art. VII, of the constitution. That is manifestly wrong. The constitution by no means provides that all
authority to act judicially is or shall be vested in some one of the
courts therein indicated. The language of the constitution is:
'The judicial power of this state, both as to matters of law and
equity, shall be vested in' the courts mentioned. The term 'matters of law and equity' refers to the administration of the law in
actions and proceedings in courts of law and equity,-the exercise
of such power in such matters as was exercised by such courts
at the time of the adoption of the constitution. .

.

. To act judi-

cially, and to act judicially in a matter at law or in equity,-or, in
other words, in actions at law or suits in equity,-are not necessarily the same." '
Even more unsatisfactory as a basis for distinguishing between
the judicial and administrative function is the test of the mechanics of procedure used by the tribunal in reaching its decision.
A few courts have, however, apparently held that a given tribunal
is or is not exercising judicial powers by considering the extent
to which its proceedings approximate those of the courts of law.
9
it appeared that the
In Western Metal Supply Co. v. Pillsbury,"
legislature
the power to proconstitution of California gave to the
under the workclaims
brought
vide a commission to adjudicate
Concerning
this constitulaw
of
the
state.
compensation
men's
tional delegation the court said:
"The power granted to the commission by the act, to determine
17It has been held that the absence of a proper standard for administrative action gives to the executive a portion of the legislative discretion and
thus makes the statute invalid. Little Chute v. Van Camp, (1908) 136 Wis.
526, 117 N. W. 1012; State ex rel. Globe Steel Tube Co. v. Lyons, (1924)
183 Wis. 107, 197 N. W. 578. Such lack has also been condemned as denial
of equal protection of the law. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, (1886) 118 U. S. 356,
Ct. 1064, 30 L. Ed. 220.
6 Sup.
18 State ex rel. Ellis v. Thorne, (1901) 112 Wis. 81, 87 N. W. 797.
19(1916) 172 Cal. 407, 156 Pac. 491.
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that a right to compensation exists and to fix by an award the
amount of such compensation is judicial in its nature... . The
correctness of this view is emphasized, indeed demonstrated, by a
brief summary of the provisions of the act defining the duties
and powers of the board with respect to claims for compensation.
The commission is vested with 'full power, authority and jurisdiction to try and finally determine' all proceedings for the recovery of compensation ....

subject only to the limited review pro-

vided in section 84 of the act. The commission has power to
administer oaths, to issue subpoenas ....

to take testimony ....

to punish for contempt 'in like manner and to the same extent as
courts of record.' . . . Where compensation is sought, the proceedings are in substance those of a court in an action at law.
'Application in writing' (i.e., a complaint) is filed with the commission by a party in interest. .

.

. The time and place for the

hearing are fixed by the commission, and a copy of the application,
together with notice of the time and place of hearing, is then
served on the adverse party. .

.

. This is, in effect, the issuance

and service of summons. The adverse party must within five days
file his answer. .

.

. Here we have the usual framing of issues

by the pleadings of the parties. After hearing by the commission,
it makes and files its findings of facts and its 'award which shall
state its determination as to the rights of the parties.' . . . The
findings thus made are 'conclusive and final,' . . . and the award

itself is not reviewable except by a writ of certiorari under which
the review is restricted in scope. .

.

. Any party in interest may

file a certified copy of the findings and award with the clerk of
the superior court and judgment must be entered by the clerk in
conformity therewith. . . . The commission, in exercising these
powers, is performing precisely the same functions that are performed by any court in passing upon questions brought before
it.,,2o

On the other hand, it is frequently held that the functions of
certain administrative bodies are not judicial, because their proceedings are lacking in some of the more common features of the
customary court proceedings. 2 1 Such differentiation is unfortunate.
It might cause the peculiar result that the legislature might delegate to an administrative body power to affect vitally the rights
and duties of the individual if it proceeded without testimony or
20See also Louisville & N. R. R. Co. v. McChord, (C.C. Ky. 1900) 103
Fed. 216; Boyd v. Mot, (Tex. Civ. App. 1922) 236 S. W. 487, reversed on
appeal, Motl v. Boyd, (1926) 116 Tex. 82, 286 S. W. 458.
2
United States v. Ferreira, (1852) 13 How. (U.S.) 40, 14 L. Ed. 42;
Board of Commissioners of Hinsdale County v. Board of Commissioners of
Mineral County, (1897) 9 Colo. App. 368, 48 Pac. 675; Speer v. Stephenson,
(1909) 16 Idaho 707, 102 Pac. 365; State v. Hathaway, (1893) 115 Mo. 36,
21 S. W. 1081; Crawford v. Hathaway, (1903) 67 Neb. 325, 93 N. NV. 781;
Farm Investment Co. v. Carpenter, (1900) 9 Wyo. 110, 61 Pac. 258.
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hearing, but could not do so if the administrative tribunal were
required to vouchsafe to those interested the safeguards which
in judicial proceedings are considered fundamental for the protection of private right.
Concerning one salient feature of the judicial process, namely
the effect of the judgment of the court as a final and conclusive
determination of the rights of the parties, more extended comment is necessary. The opinion by Chief Justice Taney in Gordon
v. United States,22 posthumously published many years after the
decision of the case, to the effect that a decision of a court could
not be accepted as within its proper jurisdiction to make unless it
carried with it the right of enforcement through judicial process,
is probably not the law today, 23 and concerning the converse situation, in which our interest now lies, it should be noticed that
administrative officers, in certain situations, are validly invested
with power to enforce by executive process their own decrees.
Thus in the leading case of Den d. Murray v'. Hoboken Land and
Improvement Co., 24 it was held that the Treasury Department
could not only determine the amount due from a delinquent
revenue agent of the government but could also enforce its determination by a distress warrant issued by the department. It has
long been a standing practice to enforce by executive process the
duty of the individual to pay taxes to the state. 5 Aliens illegally
within the country are deported entirely by administrative determination and process,2" and the Supreme Court has upheld the
imposition and enforcement by administrative process of penalties
upon ship companies illegally bringing aliens into the country."
Still another common instance of administrative execution is the
22(1865) 2 Wall. (U.S.) 561, 17 L. Ed. 921. "The award of an execution is a part, and an essential part, of every judgment passed by a court
exercising judicial power. It is no judgment in the legal sense of the term
without it."
23United States v. Jones, (1886) 119 ,U. S. 477, 7 Sup. Ct. 283, 30 L.
Ed. 440; Nashville, etc., Ry. v. Wallace, (1933) 288 U. S. 249, 53 Sup. Ct.
345, 77 L. Ed. 730; Borchard, The Constitutionality of Declaratory Judgments, (1931) 31 Col. L. Rev. 561.
24(1855)
25

18 How. (U.S.)

272, 15 L. Ed. 372.

Werner v. Bunbury, (1874) 30 Mich. 201; Coffin v. Bennett, (1928)
277 U. S. 29, 48 Sup. Ct. 422, 72 L. Ed. 768; 3 Cooley, The Law of Taxation, 4th ed., 2614. This power of administrative determination and execution has recently been extended to include the collection of a tax from a
fraudulent transferee of the taxpayer. Phillips v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, (1931) 283 U. S. 589, 51 Sup. Ct. 608, 75 L. Ed. 1289.
268 U. S. C. A. 8, sec. 165, 1 Mason's U. S. Code, tit. 8, sec. 165.
27Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, (1909) 214 ,U. S. 320,
29 Sup. Ct. 671, 53 L. Ed. 1013.
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summary abatement of nuisances and the seizure of property illegally held.28 Assuming, if we may, that an administrative enforcement is permissible in the above cases only because of some peculiar governmental power or public exigency and that administrative enforcement of decisions involving purely private rights, for
example in a workmen's compensation case, would not be permissible, 29 this possible prohibition is easily avoided by the expedient
of having the administrative order filed in a court of law, where,
unless attacked, it automatically becomes a judgment of the court
enforceable as such by the regular judicial process.2 0
The consideration that an administrative decision is subject
to subsequent attack and review in a court of law has, however,
frequently been held decisive of the fact that judicial functions
have not been conferred. There are many possible degrees of the
extent of such review. Where the administrative determination
is merely advisory and without effect until approved by a regular
judicial tribunal, which has full liberty to approve or reject the
same, there is no difficulty in holding that judicial functions have
not been conferred. In such instances, the administrative body
acts merely as a referee or a master in chancery to report its findings to the court.31 In Lawton v. Steele,3 2 the court went further
and held that a party whose property had been destroyed by an
executive official as constituting a nuisance had no valid complaint,
since he still had available the judicial remedy to replevy his property or to sue the officer in damages. Such inconclusive administrative determinations are, however, unsatisfactory. The sum28Lawton v. Steele, (1894) 152 U. S. 133, 14 Sup. Ct. 499, 38 L. Ed.

385; North American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, (1908) 211 U. S. 306,
29 Sup. Ct. 101, 53 L. Ed. 195; Samuels v. McCurdy, (1925) 267 U. S. 188,
45 Sup. Ct. 264, 69 L. Ed. 568; Lowell v. Seeback, (1891) 45 Minn. 465,
48 N. W. 23; King v. Davenport, (1881) 98 11. 305; Haberty v. Bass,
(1876) 66 Maine 71; Neff v. Paddock, (1870) 26 Wis. 546; Wilcox v.
Hemming,
(1883) 58 Wis. 144, 15 N. W. 435.
29
See Mackin v. Detroit-Timken Axle Co., (1915) 187 Mich. 8, 153
N. W.
49.
3
oIt should be noticed, moreover, that many administrative decisions,
such as denial of claims against the state or the refusal or cancellation of
licenses, are self-executing, needing no further process to give them effect.
31
Stuart v. Norviel, (1924) 26 Ariz. 493, 226 Pac. 908; In re Shattuck,
(1929) 208 Cal. 6, 279 Pac. 998; Board of Commissioners of Hinsdale
County v. Board of Commissioners of Mineral County, (1897) 9 Colo. App.
368, 48 Pac. 675; American Sulphur & Mining Co. v. Brennan, (1905) 20
Colo. App. 439, 79 Pac. 750; Speer v. Stephenson, (1909) 16 Idaho 707,
102 Pac. 365; Cosmopolitan Trust Co. v. Mitchell, (19-2) 242 Mass. 95,
136 N. E. 403; In Re Scott, (1930) 53 Nev. 24, 292 Pac. 991; In re Willow
Creek, (1914) 74 Or. 592,144 Pac. 505; Gough v. Dorsey, (1870) 27 Wis. 119.
32(1894) 152 U. S. 133, 14 Sup. Ct. 499, 38 L. Ed. 385.
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mary and less technical administrative process does not relieve of
the necessity of resorting to the courts. It is merely an added
load to the already heavy burden of litigation. Accordingly, it is
customary to afford to the administrative finding a greater or less
determinative effect. Such finding may be made final unless subsequently attacked by judicial proceedings, and even then the
administrative determination may be final unless found to be in
excess of jurisdiction, in error of law, or arbitrarily and illegally
arrived at. Such limited power of review in the courts is frequently held sufficient to prevent the administrative determination from being held invalid as an unconstitutional exercise of
judicial power. Thus in the leading case of Bargnis v. Falk,"
the workmen's compensation law of Wisconsin made the findings
of fact by an industrial commission final except where procured
by fraud, made in excess of the commission's power, or made in
error of law. This was held to give to the reviewing court power
to review the commission's finding where determinative of the
latter's jurisdiction. The resulting inconclusiveness of the commission's determinations was held sufficient to save the statute
against the contention that judicial power had been illegally
granted. 34 In thus upholding the grant to administrative bodies
of fact-finding powers which, by statute, are given a limited determinative quality, these courts are merely recognizing the right of
the legislature to place upon them the same restrictions as the
courts themselves have voluntarily adopted when administrative
decisions are attacked by proceedings in mandamus, certiorari, or
by injunction.35 The grant to executive boards of the power to
make administrative determinations has, however, at times been
held to constitute an unconstitutional grant of judicial power, even
though such determinations were subject to full court review. In
State v. Guilbert, 6 involving the provision of a land registration
33(1911) 147 Wis. 327, 133 N. W. 209.
3
4See to the same effect: Oregon R. & N. Co. v. Campbell, (C.C. Ore.
1909) 173 Fed. 957; Alabam's Freight Co. v. Hunt, (1926) 29 Ariz. 419,
242 Pac. 658; Gregory v. Hecke, (1925) 73 Cal. App. 268, 238 Pac. 787;
Hunter v. Colfax Consol. Coal Co., (1915) 175 Iowa 245, 154 N. W. 1037;
Meffert v. Medical Board, (1903) 66 Kan. 710, 72 Pac. 247; State v. Public
Service Commission of Kansas, (1932) 135 Kan. 491, 11 Pac. (2d) 999;
George v. Consolidated Lighting Co., (1914) 87 Vt. 411, 89 AtIl. 635.
35People ex rel. Folk v. Board of Police and Excise, (1877) 69 N. Y.
408; State ex rel. N. C. Forster Lbr. Co. v. Williams, (1904) 123 Wis.
61, 100 N. W. 1048; Board of County Commissioners v. People, (1898) 78
Ill. 586; Sanborn v. Weir, (1921) 95 Vt. 1, 112 Atil. 228; State ex rel.
Heller v. Thornhill, (1913) 174 Mo. App. 469, 160 S. W. 558; Bates &
Guild v. Payne, (1904) 194 U. S. 106, 24 Sup. Ct. 595, 48 L. Ed. 894.
3(1897) 56 Ohio St. 575, 47 N. E. 551.
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statute under the so-called Torrens system, the court examined
the functions of the recorder under the act and found them judicial in nature. This being so, the constitutional invalidity of such
grant of judicial power was not obviated by provisions for an
appeal to the courts.
"The recorder, as a ministerial officer, is incompetent to receive
a grant of judicial power from the legislature. His acts in the
attempted exercise of such powers are necessarily nullities. They
cannot be effective to impose any obligation or burden upon a citizen, or to deprive him of any right. The act plainly contemplates
that the person against whom the recorder decides in the exercise
of any of the powers sought to be conferred must either submit
to the adverse decision, or take upon himself the burden of an
appeal. In view of the constitutional provision on the subject, he
cannot be forced to this alternative. If these are judicial powers,
it is admitted that they cannot be vested in the recorder. If they
are not judicial, the provisions for an appeal are void, since, as
was said by this court in Ex parte Logan Branch...... we have
no idea of an appeal, except from one court to another.' "
In another Torrens case, 37 a similar result was reached by
the Illinois court.
"If the party or officer is clothed with the power of adjudicating upon and protecting the rights or interests of contesting parties, and that adjudication involves the construction and application of the lav, and affects any of the rights or interests of the
parties, though not finally determining the rights, it is still a
judicial proceeding or the exercise of judicial functions."
It has also been held that the disbarment of attorneys is such
an integral part of the judicial power that the function cannot be
imposed upon boards of commissioners or bar examiners, even
though the affected parties might appeal from their decision to
that of the supreme court.3 8 Again, in Board of Water Engineers
v. McKuight,39 a statute of texas gave to a board of water engineers, after investigation and hearing, the power of determining
the rights of adverse claimants to use the public waters of the
state for irrigation and power purposes. The finding of the
board was determinative of the rights of the parties unless within
3

7People ex rel. Kern v. Chase, (1896) 165 Il1. 527, 46 N. E. 454.
385n re Edwards, (1928) 45 Idaho 676, 266 Pac. 655; In re Gibson,
(1931) 35 N. M. 550, 4 Pac. (2d) 643; In re Bruen, (1918) 102 Wash.
472, 172 Pac. 1152. Where, however, the board does not itself disbar but
reports its findings to the court, which, with full power of review, enters
the order of disbarment, no constitutional objection is found. In re Shattuck, (1928) 208 Cal. 6, 279 Pac. 998; In re Scott, (1930) 53 Nev. 24,
292 Pac. 291; State Bar v. McGhee, (1931) 148 Okla. 219, 298 Pac. 580.
-9(1921) 111 Tex. 82, 229 S. W. 301.
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sixty days thereafter an appeal was taken to the district court
wherein a trial de novo could be had. It was held, however, that
this was an unconstitutional grant to the board of judicial power,
the vice of which was not cured by the provision for repeal. The
court said:
"It is earnestly argued that the statutes are saved from constitutional infirmity because the action of the Board is final only
as to those who desire it to be final, for it is said any dissatisfied
claimant is entitled to a court trial de novo. The Constitution, in
its prohibition against conferring on persons in one governmental
department power belonging to another, contains no exception of
instances wherein the latter department may review the acts of
the former. The constitution
making no such exception, the
4 °
courts should not make it.

0

Admitting for purposes of argument that it would be unconstitutional in most instances to confer upon an administrative body
the power of final and conclusive determination enforceable by
that body's own executionary writ, this concession does not save
the judicial function of the courts from serious infringement.
The essence of the judicial duty is to decide. If as a practical
matter that ultimate decision rests with an administrative tribunal,
to that extent has the judicial power of the court been affected.
If all the courts do is to furnish the enforcement process for
the administrative determination, the essence of the judicatory
function is with the latter and not with the former body. So also
judicial review of only a limited portion of the commission's determination leaves the commission as the sole and final arbiter of
that part of the controversy to which the judicial review does not
extend. Any one familiar with workmen's compensation litigation, for example, knows full well that in ninety per cent. of the
cases it is the commission's determination of the facts which is
the conclusive and decisive factor. Even where full judicial
review is afforded, the administrative decision may, for practical
reasons, be the final word. In the case of the poor fisherman
40
The case is contrary to the decisions of the Nebraska and Wyoming
courts under similar statutes. Crawford v. Hathaway, (1903) 67 Neb. 325,
93 N. W. 781; Farm Investment Co. v. Carpenter, (1900) 9 Wyo. 110. 61
Pac. 258. The subsequent Texas case of Motl v. Boyd, (1928) 116 Tex.
82, 286 S. W. 458, reversing Boyd v. Motl, (1922) 236 S. W. 487, sustained
the power of the board to grant permits to use unappropriated waters even
though contests might arise concerning such permits, on the ground that
the grant or refusal of a license was a mere ministerial act not involving
vested property rights. "There is nothing in the statute which makes the
conclusion of the board that the permit applied for would or would not
impair existing water rights conclusive or binding on any one."
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whose nets have been summarily destroyed by a game warden,
it is little more than contemptuous irony to tell him that in theory
of law the executive determination has not affected his rights,
since he still possesses the liberty of spending time and money far
beyond his ability to command in a possibly vain pursuit against
the officer for damages. What is here said is offered not in argument against judicial powers of administrative tribunals but
rather in emphasis of the belief that the current provisions for
judicial execution and review do not, from the realistic viewpoint, prevent large measures of the judicial functions from being conferred on executive bodies.
II
To differentiate the judicial from the administrative by an
analysis of the operations performed in carrying out the two
functions is as a general proposition a futile task. The question
whether judicial powers have or have not been validly conferred
is determined not by the manner in which the issues are decided
but by the character of the issues which are referred to the administrative body for decision. In Louisville & Nashville R. v.
Garrett,41 upholding the administrative determination of railroad
rates, the court said:
"Even where it is essential to maintain strictly the distinction
between the judicial and other branches of the government, it
must still be recognized that the ascertainment of facts, or the
reaching of conclusions upon evidence taken in the course of a
hearing of parties interested, may be entirely proper in the
exercise of executive or legislative, as distinguished from judicial
powers. The legislature, had it seen fit, might have conducted
similar 'inquiries through committees of its members, or specially
constituted bodies, upon whose report as to the reasonableness of
existing rates it would decide whether or not they were extortionate a1nd whether other rates should be established, and it might
have used methods like those of judicial tribunals in the endeavor
to elicit the facts. It is 'the nature of the final act' that determines
'the nature of. the -previous inquiry.' "'
41(1913) 231 U. S. 298, 34 Sup. Ct. 48, 58 L. Ed. 229.
42
See also: People ex rel. Hubbard v. Colorado Title & Trust Co.,
(1918) 65 Colo. 472, 178 Pac. 6, abandonment of service on railroad;
Klafter v. State Board of Examiners of Architects, (1913) 259 Il1. 15, 102
N. E. 193, revocation of license; Italia America Shipping Corporation v.
Nelson, (1926) 323 Ill. 427, 154 N. E. 198, granting and revocation of
licenses; Conover v. Gatton, (1911) 251 Ill. 587, 96 N. E. 522; Missouri
Southern R. Co. v. Public Service Commission, (1919) 279 Mo. 484, 214
S. W. 379, rate making: C. & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Wisconsin Zinc Co.,
(1920) 172 Wis. 407, 179 N. W. 588; Pillsbury, Administrative Tribunals,
(1923) 36 Harv. L. Rev. 405.
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It is just as impossible, however, to include within one definition those issues that are inherently administrative, as it is to include within the "ringfence of a definition" those types of proceedings that are judicial in character. The determination of
certain issues by administrative rather than by judicial tribunals
depends upon a complexity of considerations, some logical, some
historical, and some purely expedient. The only thing to do,
therefore, is to examine the existing situation and to see what
functions in fact have been held administrative in character and
what judicial. If we cannot define, we may at least describe. 48
To make a rough classification of the types of problems which
have been committed to administrative determination is not difficult. 1. First are those matters of primary public concern in
which the individual citizen has an interest only to the extent
that he happens to be a member of the body corporate. 2. In
the second class may be placed those proceedings in which the
state has a direct interest, but where the individual is also directly
affected as the other party to the jural relation; of this the assessment and collection of taxes is perhaps the most outstanding example. 3. The third classification is a subhead of the second,
but is distinguished by the fact that in certain situations the state
has granted to the individual a privilege which is ordinarily
held by the courts to be within the absolute prerogative of the
state either to confer or to withhold. The determination of the
validity of claims by the individual against the state for alleged
wrongs committed by the latter come within this category. 4.
In the exercise of its police power the state acts as a conservator
of social interests, and in so doing, through the medium of the
powers to license, quarantine, and abate nuisances, directly
affects the interests of the individual citizen. 5. In some situations the state, through administrative machinery, attempts to
exercise the quasi-criminal function of imppsing penalties and
forfeitures. 6. Lastly, by administrative means, the state may
settle controversies between individuals in which the state is interested only to the extent that it is always concerned in the
orderly and effective administration of justice. The workmen's
compensation laws give rise to the most outstanding example of
this type of administrative adjudication.
4

3Cf. Pillsbury,

405, 419 et seq.

Administrative Tribunals, (1923)

36 Harv. L. Rev.
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1. MATTERS PRIMARILY OF PUBLIC CONCERN.

The best illustration of controversies of a purely public character is in the creation and division of political subdivisions:
counties, cities, villages, school districts, and the like. In Early
County v. Baker County,4" a statute of Georgia provided that,
when the grand jury of a county should inform the governor that
the territorial boundary was in dispute, he should appoint a
surveyor to determine the controverted line. The survey made
was reported to the secretary of state, who, after a hearing, had
power to determine conclusively the disputed boundary. In
answer to the contention that this constituted an illegal grant of
judicial power to the secretary, the court said:
"Counties have no territorial rights as against the state, and
the statutory plan was not to settle a private dispute between the
counties, but to afford means to the state in the delineation of the
boundaries between its political subdivisions. If the decision of
the secretary of state is to have the ordinary force and effect of
a judgment rendered in a judicial proceeding, then territorial
rights would become vested, and the legislature could not make a
change, so as to disturb or alter the divisional line as adjudged
by the secretary of state. Whereas all the authorities concur that,
unless the constitution of a state otherwise prescribes, the Legislature has the power to diminish or enlarge the area of a county, or
change its boundary lines, whenever the public convenience or
necessity requires."
A similar reliance on the paramount legislative power over the
controversies has also been made when administrative bodies have
been given final authority in the case of the division of governmental units to apportion between the two new districts the
property and debts of the old divided districts." This positive
declaration that the creation, delimitation, and division of governmental corporations is a matter of public, rather than of private,
right and so cognizable by non-judicial tribunals is undoubtedly
due somewhat to the fact that the issues involved are not of the
type which a court may properly determine. They depend upon
practical, political, and governmental expediencies not to be solved
by the-determination of exact facts or by the application thereto of
44(1911) 137 Ga. 126, 72 S. E. 905.
45
Smithwick School District v. Lincoln School District, (1916) 37
S. D. 38, 156 N. W. 587; State ex rel. Perea v. Board of Commissioners,
(1919) 25 N. M. 338, 182 Pac. 865. See also Board of Commissioners,
Board of Commissioners, (1897) 9 Colo. App. 368, 48 Pac. 675, judicial
review allowed; Lausen v. Board of Supervisors, (1927) 204 Iowa 30,
214 N. W. 682; Nash.v. Glen Elder, (1910) 81 Kan. 446, 106 Pac. 292.
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known principles of law. Such issues are properly decided by
popular representative bodies and not by courts trained in the
law. The same consideration holds true in regard to the location
and abandonment of highways."
The major problem being within
the legislative rather than within the judicial cognizance, all minor
issues therein remain within the domain of that body to dispose of,
even though, viewed as matters integral within themselves, they
could properly be decided by a judicial tribunal.
2.

CONTROVERSIES BETWEEN THE STATE AND THE INDIVIDUAL.

Such controversies as those mentioned in subdivision A are
comparatively few in number, and the constitutional issue is not a
serious one. Much more frequent and important are the issues
which arise when the public interest directly involves the interests of the individual. Such questions, moreover, in their
solution call into play not only broad questions of political expediency but also the determination of ordinary fact questions
and the application thereto of customary rules of law.
(1) The assessment and collection of the state revenues commonly gives rise to issues of this latter type, and yet it is perfectly
well established that the matter is primarily one for administrative
and not for judicial cognizance.
"Very summary remedies have been allowed, in every age and
country, for the collection by the government of its revenues.
They have been considered a matter of state necessity. . . . If the
state might be deprived of the resources for continuing its existence and performing its regular functions until a revenue could
be collected by the processes provided for the enforcement of debts
owing to individuals, it would be continually at the mercy of
factions and discontented parties. Obviously this could not be
tolerated."'47
"The proceedings by which taxes for governmental purposes
have been assessed, levied and collected from the citizen have
always been regarded as administrative, and not judicial in their
character, and to constitute due process of law within the meaning of the constitution. Such proceedings have from necessity
been exercised by governments during all times, by summary
methods of procedure, and to require the deliberation and delay
incidental to judicial proceedings in the exercise and enforcement
of the taxing power by government would
seriously cripple its
' 48
efficiency, if not destroy its existence.
4
GConover v. Gatten, (1911) 251 Ill. 587, 96 N. E. 522; Van Hess v.
Board of Commissioners, (1921) 190 Ind. 347, 129 N. E. 305.
473 Cooley, Law of Taxation, 4th ed., 2614.
4
SMatter of McMahon v. Palmer, (1886) 102 N. Y. 176.
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These statements meet with a general response in the cases,'"
and as long as the assessing tribunal affords a hearing and acts
fairly and within its jurisdiction, a court review of its action is
not a constitutional requisite."
(2) Closely akin to taxation is the exercise of the power of
eminent domain, and whether the question be the expediency of
the projected improvement" or the award to be made for the
property taken in the exercise of the power, it is well settled that
in the absence of express constitutional provision to the contrary
a trial in a court of justice is not required for the settlement of
this issue.
"The proceeding for the ascertainment of the value of the
property and consequent compensation to be made is merely an
inquisition to establish a particular fact as a preliminary to the
actual taking; and it may be prosecuted before commissioners or
special boards or the courts with or without the intervention of
the jury, as the legislative power may designate. All that is required is that it shall be conducted in some fair and just manner
with opportunity to owners of the property to present evidence as
to its value and to be heard thereon." 2
49See Kelly v. Pittsburgh, (1881) 104 U. S. 78, 26 L Ed. 658; State
v. Ill. Central R., (1910) 246 Ill. 188, 92 N. E. 814; Williams v. Wedding,
(1915) 165 Ky. 361, 176 S.W. 1176; M. K. & T. Ry. v. Shannon, (1907)
100 Tex. 379, 100 S. W. 138; State ex rel.
Ellis v. Thorne, (1901) 112
Wis. 81, 87 N. W. 797. In Den d. Murray v. Hoboken Land and Improvement Company, (1855) 18 How. (U.S.) 272, 15 L. Ed. 372, the court
sustained the collection by administrative process of the indebtedness to the
United States of a collector of internal revenue. The court said:
"Tested by the common and statute law of England prior to the emigration of our ancestors, and by the laws of many of the States at the time
of the adoption of this amendment, the proceedings authorized by the act
of 1820 cannot be denied to be due process of law, when applied to the
ascertainment and recovery of balances due to the government from a collector of customs, unless there exists in the constitution some other provision which restrains congress from authorizing such proceedings ...
Probably there are few governments which do and can permit their claims
for public taxes, either on the citizen or the officer employed for their collection or disbursement, to become subjects of judicial controversy, according to the course of the law of the land. Imperative necessity has forced
a distinction between such claims and all others, which has sometimes been
carried out by summary methods of proceeding, and sometimes by systems
of fines and penalties, but always in some way observed and yielded to."
In Phillips v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, (1931) 283 U. S. 589,
51 Sup. Ct. 608, 75 L. Ed. 1289, the court sustained on the same ground
of public necessity the administrative assessment and collection of a tax
from5 a fraudulent transferee of a defaulting tax payer.
OFallbrook Irrigation District v. Bradley, (1896) 164 U. S. 112, 17
Sup. Ct. 56, 41 L. Ed. 369; Finney County v. Bullard, (1908) 77 Kan. 349,
94 Pac. 129; Mayer v. C. & P. Telephone Co., (1917) 131 fd. 50, 101 Ad.
677; Stratsford v. Franklin Paper Mills Co., (1917) 257 Pa. St. 163, 101
Atl. 5349.
'People v. Smith, (1860) 21 N. Y. 595.
52United States v. Jones, (1883) 101 U. S. 514, 519, 25 L Ed. 929.
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Whether a certain improvement is desirable as a matter of
public policy is certainly not proper matter for judicial determination, but the determination of the compensation to be awarded for
the property taken cannot so be disposed of. The reason given
for the non-judicial determination of such issues is usually the
historical one that at the time our constitutions were established
the administrative rather than the judicial character of eminent
domain proceedings was well settled.r"
(3) Another class of controversies in which public and individual interests are closely intermingled arises in connection
with elections. The great weight of authority is that such mat(
"
ters are political and not judicial in character. In Dickey v.Reed,
involving an election to determine whether the City of Chicago
should adopt a new charter, the court declined to enjoin the new
government on the alleged ground of fraud in election, saying:
"Elections belong to the political branch of the government,
and are beyond the control of the judicial power. It was not
designed, when the fundamental law of the State was framed, that
either department of government should interfere with or control
the other, and it is for the political power of the State, within the
limits of the constitution, to provide the manner in which elections
thus elected shall
shall be held, and the manner in which officers
55
be qualified, and their elections contested.

The legislative power to provide the determination by nonjudicial tribunals, not only of the results of election, but also of
See also Koppikus v. State Capitol Commission, (1860) 16 Cal. 249;

George v. Consolidated Lighting Co., (1914) 87 Vt. 411, 89 At. 635; 2
Law of Eminent Domain, 2d ed., 773.
Lewis,
53
Edwards v. Cheyenne, (1911) 19 Wyo. 110, 114 Pac. 677; 2 Lewis,
Law of Eminent Domain, 2d ed., 773. Some state constitutions require
that the compensation for the property taken must be assessed by a jury.
Constitution of Ohio, art. XIII, sec. 5. Constitution of Washington, art. I,
sec. 16. The administrative proceedings must be before an impartial
tribunal with opportunity for a hearing on a controverted issue in order to
accord with due process of law. Langford v. County of Ramsey, (1870)
16 Minn. 375. In White v. Maverick County Water etc. District, (1931)
35 S. W. (2d) 107 it was held an unconstitutional grant of judicial power
to invest an irrigation district with the power to condemn. See also Marin
Water, etc., Co. v. California R. Comm., (1916) 171 Cal. 706, 154 Pac. 864.
54(1875) 78 Ill. 261.
55
See also Toncray v. Budge, (1908) 14 Idaho 621, 95 Pac. 26; Allen
v. Burrow, (1904) 69 Kan. 812, 77 Pac. 555; In re Freeholders of Hudson
County, (1928) 105 N. J. L. 57, 143 Ati. 536; Williamson v. Lane, (1879)
52 Tex. 335; State v. Superior Court, (1914) 81 Wash. 623, 143 Pac. 461.
"The manner of contesting elections is regulated entirely by the statute.
The jurisdiction, mode of control, and the entire contest are purely statutory
and are beyond the judicial power. A contest is neither an action at law
nor in equity and cannot be brought before any court unless the statute so
provides." Bowen v. Russell, (1916) 272 Ill. 313, 111 N. E. 978.
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the qualifications of individuals to register as voters has been
based on the belief that the doctrine of the separation of powers
leaves to the legislative branch full control of the processes
through which the popular will may be expressed. 0
(4) In regard to removal from public office, while it is generally recognized that the legislature in creating such offices may
provide for the determination of the term thereof by the arbitrary
will of some superior officer, where the statute provides for removal only on specific charges of misfeasance, there is some
conflict. The matter is thoroughly discussed in the leading case
T
of State ex rel. Attorney General v. Hawkins.
"The incumbent of an office has not, under our system of government, any property in it. His right to exercise it is not based
upon any contract or grant. It is conferred on him as a public
trust to be exercised for the benefit of the public .... A public
office and its creation is a matter of public, and not of private,
law. The legislature had the power to provide for the creation
of a board of police commissioners for cities of the grade and
class of Cincinnati. This power carried with it, as an incident
of its exercise, the power to provide a mode of removal, unless
restrained by some provision of the constitution, to the mere act
of providing for the appointment of members of the board, which
is not the case. . . . There is no requirement that the power of
removal, that may be prescribed by law, shall be conferred on the
courts, for the legislature is to provide the manner, as well as
the cause of removal ...
"A different view has been taken by the courts of some of
the states ....
But these decisions have, as a rule, proceeded upon
the ground that an incumbent has a property in his office, and
that he can not be deprived of his right without the judgment of
a court. This view finds support in the doctrines of the common
law, which regarded an office as a hereditament, but has no
foundation whatever in a representative government like our
own..
.. It is claimed that a distinction should be taken in the
cases where the power of appointing and removing are reposed in
one and the same person, and where it is reposed in different
persons. We are aware that this distinction exists in the facts
of some of the cases, but we are not aware that any distinction in
principle has been based upon it. Whether the person removed
was or was not appointed to his office by the official that is vested
with the power to remove, can not, as we see it, change the essential character of the power of removal. It is also claimed that
a distinction should be taken between the case where an appoint58
See Dallas v. Consolidated St. Ry., (1912) 105 Tex. 337, 148 S. W.
292.
17(1886) 44 Ohio St. 98, 5 N. E. 228.
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ment to an office is made to be held by the appointee at the pleasure
of the appointing power, and, where it is with a provision for
removal for misconduct. But there is none in principle, so far
as the right to remove is concerned. The office, in either case, is
held subject to the terms upon which it was created, and the
mode of removal prescribed. As it may be so created as that the
incumbent shall hold at the pleasure of the appointing power, then
for a stronger reason, the appointment may be made to depend
upon removal for cause, irrespective of where the power to remove may be lodged. .

.

. It is a strange sort of logic which

reaches the result, that the office may be accepted in the manner
prescribed by the legislature, and the mode of removal rejected. '5 8
Expressions to the effect that the power to remove, since it
calls for the investigation of evidence and the application and
construction of law, is an exclusive judicial function"' have
occurred in cases where the removing officer acted without granting a hearing to the accused official. This is a horse of another
color. 0 It is doubtful today, when the grant of quasi-judicial
functions to administrative bodies has become exceedingly common and where the public exigency often calls for prompt removal of unfaithful officials without waiting for the slow judicial
process, whether many courts would follow the dicta of these
earlier cases.
3.

MATTERS OF PRIVILEGE.

In a large class of cases the non-judicial determination of
controversies is sustained on the ground that the subject matter
thereof is a matter only of privilege and not of right. There is
no right to sue the state, and the payment by the state of claims
made against it is purely a matter of grace. Therefore, it is held
that the state may provide such machinery as it wishes for the
determination of those claims which it allows to be presented.' 1
Also public lands are the property of the state to be retained or
disposed of as it may desire. If the latter course is selected, the
5SIn accord, see Donahue v. County of Will, (1881) 100 Il1. 94; State
ex rel. Clapp v. Peterson, (1892) 50 Minn. 239, 52 N. W. 655; State
ex rel. Caldwell v. Wilson, (1897) 121 N. C. 425, 28 S. E. 554; State ex
v. Frazier, (1918) 39 N. D. 430, 167 N. W. 510.
rel. Shaw
59Dullam v. Willson, (1884) 53 Mich. 392, 19 N. W. 112; State v.
Pritchard, (1873) 36 N. J. L. 101.
0
See also Christy v. City of Kingfisher, (1904) 13 Okla. 585, 76 Pac.
135, which is of this same type. Orkle v. Board of Commissioners, (1895)
41 W. Va. 471, 23 S. E. 804 is, however, directly opposed to State v.
(1886) 44 Ohio St. 98, 5 N. E. 228.
Hawkins,
6
'United States v. Ferreira, (1852) 13 How. (,U.S.) 40, 14 L. Ed. 42;
Carolina Glass Co. v. State, (1910) 87 S. C. 270, 69 S. E. 391; Hoyt v.
Hughes County, (1913) 32 S. D. 117, 142 N. W. 471.
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state may provide a non-judicial means for the determination of
all questions arising concerning the claim of individuals to take
of its bounty even to the extent of settling the claims of contesting private parties to the land in question.' 2 So again when state
funds are created to provide remuneration for those particularly
in need of state assistance, the same conclusion is reached. Concerning the determination of the right of a bank depositor to participate in a state bank deposit guarantee fund, the North Dakota
court said:
"The privilege of enjoying the benefits of the fund was conferred as a matter of grace. It cannot be demanded as a matter
of right. It was optional with the legislature whether any means
should be pro-vided whereby claims against the fund might be
established, and so the legislature might prescribe such rules
and
0'
regulations in that behalf as it deemed just and proper."
Within this class of cases come all questions arising out of
governmental pensions and benefits allocated to the veterans of
the wars,64 and the privilege of the individual citizen to use the
United States mail has been held subject to conclusive administrative decision on the apparent ground that the postal service is a
matter of grace, and the government therefore "may annex such
conditions to it as it chooses."0 5 In the above cases the government may perhaps be visualized as a benevolent St. Nicholas for
whose gratuitous disposition of public property and funds prospective donees have no right to sue the donor in the courts of law.
The theory of individual privilege as distinct from individual
right has, however, been extended to certain other interests in
which the government is considered to have the paramount right
either to withhold or to grant. In Nishimtura Ekih( v. United
States.6 , the court said:
62

Smelting Co. v. Kemp, (1881) 104 U. S. 636, 26 L. Ed. 875; Griffin
v. Kennedy, (1907) 148 Mich. 583, 112 N. W. 756; State ex rel. Abbott v.
Ross,63 (1911) 62 Wash. 82, 113 Pac. 273.
Standard Oil Co. v. Engel, (1927) 55 N. D. 163, 212 N. W. 822.
See also Cunningham v. North Western Improvement Co., (1911) 44 Mont.
180, 119 Pac. 554, the state workmen's compensation fund; State v. Taylor,
(1916) 33 N. D. 76, 156 N. W. 561, state fund bonding public official;
State v. Creamer, (1912) 85 Ohio St. 349, 97 N. E. 602, state workmen's
compensation fund.
64Decatur v. Paulding, (1840) 14 Pet. (U.S.) 497, 10 L Ed. 559;
Silberschein v. United States, (1924) 266 U. S. 221, 45 Sup. Ct. 69, 69 L.
Ed. 256.
65
Public Clearing House v. Coyne, (1904) 194 U. S. 497, 24 Sup.
Ct. 789, 48 L. Ed. 1092. See also Bates & Guild Co. v. Payne, (1904) 194
U. S. 106, 24 Sup. Ct 595, 48 L. Ed. 894; United States ex rel. Milwaukee
Social Dem. Pub. Co. v. Burleson, (1921) 255 U. S. 407, 41 Sup. Ct.
352, 65 L. Ed. 704.
66(1892) 142 U. S. 651, 12 Sup. Ct. 336, 35 L. Ed. 1146.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

"It is an accepted maxim of international law that every
sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in sovereignty, and
essential to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners
within its domains, or to admit them only in such cases and upon
such conditions as it may see fit to prescribe. .

.

. An alien im-

migrant prevented from landing by any such officer claiming
authority to do so under an act of congress, and thereby restrained of his liberty, is doubtless entitled to a writ of habeas
corpus to ascertain whether the restraint is lawful. .

.

. But, on

the other hand, the final determination of those facts may be intrusted by congress to executive officers; and in such a case, as
in all others, in which a statute gives a discretionary power to an
officer, to be exercised by him upon his own opinion of certain
facts, he is made the sole and exclusive judge of the existence
of those facts, and no other tribunal, unless expressly authorized
by law to do so, is at liberty to re-examine or'0 7controvert the su fficiency of the evidence on which he acted.
This power of congress to submit claims to administrative determination also extends to controversies arising from the deportation of aliens unlawfully within the country"' and to the importation into the country by citizens of foreign-made goods. 60
The role played in these cases by the theory that the matter in
controversy is one within the plenary power of government is
shown by those cases which hold that a trial in one of the regular
courts of the land is necessary when a bona fide claim of citizenship is made by a deportee or when a government seeks not only
to eject but also to punish an alien unlawfully within the coun70
try.
The quasi-judicial function of administrative bodies in a
widely separated field from those just considered may also be
67
See

also United States v. Ju Toy, (1905) 198 U. S. 253, 25 Sup.
Ct. 644, 49 L. Ed. 1040.
68 Fong Yue Ting v. United States, (1893) 149 U. S. 698, 13 Sup.
Ct. 1016, 37 L. Ed. 905; United States ex rel. Tisi v. Tod, (1924) 264
U. S. 131, 44 Sup. Ct. 260, 68 L. Ed. 590.
69
Passavant v. United States, (1893) 148 U. S.214, 13 Sup. Ct. 572,
37 L. Ed. 426; Butterfield v. Stranahan, (1904) 192 U. S.470, 24 Sup. Ct.
349, 48 L. Ed. 525.
70Ng Fung Ho v. White, (1922) 259 U. S.276, 42 Sup. Ct. 492, 66
L. Ed. 938; Wong Wing v. United States, (1896) 163 U. S.228, 16 Sup.
Ct. 977, 41 L. Ed. 140. In Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan.
(1909) 214 ,U.S. 320, 29 Sup. Ct. 671, 53 L. Ed. 1013 the theory of absolute
government prerogative received its fullest recognition in the holding that
the United States could, because of its control over the subject matter of
the admission of aliens, by administrative determination, without a hearing
impose a fine on the steamship company for illegally bringing aliens into
the country and collect such fine by the administrative means of refusing
clearance papers to the vessel involved until the fine was paid.
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sustained on the theory that the subject matter involved is within
the plenary power of the state. The grant and forfeiture of corporate charters and privileges may be, and often is, committed to
administrative bodies. This is exceedingly common in the regulation of insurance corporations. 7 1 In the early case of Hartford
Fire Insurance Co. v. Raymond7 2 the state law provided for the
revocation by the secretary of state of the license of a foreign
insurance company if it appeared to him that the financial condition of the company was such as not to justify its continuance of
the business in the state. The supreme court of Michigan upheld
this exercise of authority by the secretary, saying:
"It is contended by the relator that the authority granted to
foreign insurance corporations to do business in this state is a
valuable right, in the nature of and equivalent to a corporate
franchise, and within the protection of constitutional safeguards;
and that the act is unconstitutional and void because it deprives
the relator of these valuable rights and privileges without due
process of law. Corporations organized under the laws of other
states to engage in and carry on business not open to citizens
generally cannot carry on business in this state, except permission,
either express or implied, is given them to do so ....

It has been

repeatedly held, and there seems to be no conflict of authority,
that corporations of one state have no right to exercise their
franchises in another state except upon the assent of such other
state, and upon such terms as may be imposed by the state where
their business is to be done. The conditions imposed may be
reasonable or unreasonable;
they are absolutely within the dis73
cretion of the legislature.1

To designate as a means of escape from constitutional
quirements certain interests as mere privileges subject to
arbitrary will of the state is unfortunate. Since the time
Bentham the better juristic philosophy was recognized that in

rethe
of
the

71

See Patterson, The Insurance Commissioner in the United States,

secs. 10-13.
72(1888) 70 Mich. 485, 38 N. W. 474.
7s
see also Domingues Land Corp. v. Daugherty, (1925) 196 Cal. 468,
238 Pac. 703; Four-S Razor Co. v. Guyman, (1922) 110 Kan. 745, 205

Pac. 635; Brooklyn Steam Transit Co. v. Brooklyn, (1879) 78 N. Y. 24;

Des Chutes v.Lara, (1928) 127 Or. 57, 270 Pac. 913. In the case of State
v. Blaisdell, (1911) 22 N. D. 86, 132 N. W. 769, the court, however, held it
unconstitutional to confer upon the secretary of state the power after a
hearing to revoke the license of a foreign corporation to do business in the
state if he found that the corporation was violating the anti-monopoly laws
of the state. The court considered that the revocation of a charter was in
the nature of a punishment and that the secretary in deciding whether or
not the company had violated the terms of the statute was acting in a
manner comparable to that of a court and was therefore exercising judicial
functions contrary to the constitution.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

legal sense all of our so-called rights are dependent on the will
of the state, which recognizes, restricts or destroys them, in accordance with what it believes the best interests of the common
society demand. 74 The "privilege" of a person injured by an
act of government to sue the state, of a business man engaged in
foreign trade to import goods from abroad, of an alien to remain
in the land where he has taken up his abode, or of a citizen to
enjoy the facilities of the postal service is just as valuable, perhaps more valuable, to him than the commoner rights of liberty
and property, concerning which it is admitted full constitutional
protection is afforded. This is not to say that administrative
action in the instances discussed in this and the preceding section should always be prohibited. There may be strong reasons
of policy and expediency, which require in certain cases the swift
and inexpensive action of the executive. But if there still remains any virtue in the doctrine which requires that judicial
functions should be bestowed only on the courts, it is the establishment of a practical balance between the demands of administrative efficiency and the protection of private interests which should
determine whether a given power should be exercised by conmissions or by courts. As will be later pointed out, behind the
doctrine of the separation of powers lie certain fundamental
political principles, which it is to the peril of the state and to individual liberty to ignore. The system of administrative adjudication cannot develop in an orderly, intelligent, and safe manner
if certain interests are arbitrarily deemed to be beyond the scope
of their control.
4. ExERCISE OF TIE POLICE POWER.

(1) No more expansive concept exists in constitutional law
than that of the police power: "The power of promoting the
public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and
property."- 5 And one of the most effective instruments for the
promotion of that welfare is that of requiring, through the medium
of a license, minimum standards of ability, knowledge, and integrity, in those trades, occupations, and professions which intimately affect the public welfare. Here we have an exercise of
governmental power that affects the most precious of individual
74

Bentham, Theory of Legislation (Translation from the French by R.

Hildreth) p. 82. See Pound, Theories of Law, (1912) 22 Yale L. J. 114,
140-146; Pound, Interests of Personality, (1915) 28 Harv. L. Rev. 343.
343-346.
5
7 Freund, The Police Power, p. III.
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interests-the practice of a trade or profession, often made extremely valuable by years of training and experience, usually
constituting the sole means of livelihood of the party affected.
The issues presented to the tribunal for decision particularly in
case of revocation moreover often present questions of fact and
lie well within the ordinary competence of a court to decide. Yet
it is perfectly well established, with a single exception to be noted
below, that there is no exercise of the judicial function in the
grant and revocation of governmental licenses by administrative
agencies. It is sometimes emphasized that the revocation of a
license is in no sense a punishment but merely the means adopted
to protect the public against the incompetent, careless, and unscrupulous. 7 6 Other courts are content with the declaration that

the grant and revocation of licenses, while involving elements of
judgment and discretion, is nevertheless only quasi-judicial and
therefore administrative in nature like the duties of man), other
executive agencies. 77 The most satisfactory explanation is perhaps that the police power, through its own inherent strength,
not only may impose on private individuals the substantive requirements of minimum standards of proficiency and honesty but
also may provide an administrative process for determining
whether those standards have been maintained. This is well set
forth in Meffert v.State Board of Medical Registration and Examination,7 where an administrative board had revoked for alleged
gross immorality a physician's license to practice:
"One of the rights reserved to the state is to determine the
qualification for office and the conditions upon which citizens may
exercise the various callings and pursuits within its limits ...
It is subversive of the morals of the people and degrading to the
medical profession for the state to clothe a grossly immoral man
with authority to enter the homes of her citizens in the capacity
of a physician. It was the intention of the legislature to adopt
a summary proceeding by which the morals of the people and the
dignity of the profession might be protected against such a possibility without being embarrassed by the technical rules of proceedings at law. . . . It is further contended that the right of a
76
People v. Apfelbaum, (1911) 251 Ill. 18, 95 N. E. 995; Kjafter v.
State77Board, (1913) 259 Ill. 15, 102 N. E. 193.
Lanterman v. Anderson, (1918) 36 Cal. App. 472, 172 Pac. 625;
Suckow v. Board of Medical Examiners, (1920) 182 Cal. 247, 187 Pac. 965;
State ex rel. Hubbard v. Holmes, (1907) 53 Fla. 226, 44 So. 179; Italia
America Shipping Corporation v. Nelson, (1926) 323 Ill.
427, 154 N. E.
198; State v. Sherow, (1912) 87 Kan. 235, 123 Pac. 866; State v. Hathaway,
(1893) 115 Mo. 36, 21 S. W. 1081.
78(1903) 66 Kan. 710, 72 Pac. 247.
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physician to practice his profession is a property right, of which
he cannot be deprived without due process of law, which plaintiff in error construes to mean the judgment of a constitutionally
created court. We have seen that it is within the police power of
a state to prescribe the qualifications of one desiring to practice
medicine, and also to provide for the creation of a board or
tribunal to make the examination and determine whether the
applicant for a license to follow this profession possesses the required qualification, and if so to issue to him such license. It must
follow that the state may confer upon the same board or tribunal
the power to revoke such license, if it should thereafter be made
to appear that the license should not have been issued, or if for
any reason
the holder thereof since its issuance becomes dis' '79
qualified.
When confronted, however, with proposed commission disbarment of attorneys the courts have revolted. Whether this is
because, as the courts have declared, the admission and disbarment of attorneys is a traditional and peculiar prerogative of the
courts or whether it is because the judges, as members of the legal
profession, have a greater understanding and sympathy for the
rights of an attorney charged with unprofessional practices may
80

perhaps be left to conjecture.

(2) Another well recognized exercise of the police power by
administrative agencies is the abatement of public nuisances. The
79

See also Gregory v. Hecke, (1925) 73 Cal. App. 268, 238 Pac. 787;
Kennedy v. State Board of Registration, (1906) 145 Mich. 241, 108 N.
W. 730.
There seems to be no sustained contention that building commissioncrs
and boards of appeal under building and zoning ordinances are exercising
judicial powers. Nevertheless their functions have frequently been referred
to as quasi-judicial in nature: Murphy v. Curley, (1914) 220 Mass. 73,
107 N. E. 378; Hendey v. Ackerman, (1927) 103 N. J. L. 305, 136 Att.
733; People ex rel. Swedish Hospital v. Leo, (1923) 120 Misc. Rep. 355,
198 N. Y. S. 397; Harden v. City of Raleigh, (1926) 192 N. C. 395, 135
S. E. 151. In Gulf Refining Co. v. City of Dallas, (Tex. Civ. App. 1928)
10 S. W. (2d) 151 it was held that the power of a building commissioner
to refuse or to revoke building permits, when found contrary to the
restrictions in deeds, was an illegal grant of judicial power. It has also
been held that where no sufficiently definite standard is afforded for the
power of a board of appeal to suspend in particular cases the general
operation of a zoning ordinance, the statute constituted an illegal delegation
of legislative power. Welton v. Hamilton, (1931) 344 Ill. 82, 176 N. E.
333. Cf. Sundeen v. Rogers, (1928) 83 N. H. 253, 141 Atl. 142; SpencerSturla Co. v. City of Memphis, (1927) 155 Tenn. 70, 290 S. W. 608; and
see Cover, Legal Status of Boards of Zoning Appeals, (1933) 8 J. Land
& Pub. Utility Econ. 352.
80
1n re Shattuck, (1929) 208 Cal. 6, 279 Pac. 998; In re Edwards,
(1928) 45 Idaho 676, 266 Pac. 665: In re Scott, (1930) 53 Nev. 24, 292
Pac. 291; In re Gibson, (1931) 35 N. M. 550, 4 Pac. (2d) 643; In re
Bruen, (1918) 102 Wash. 472, 172 Pac. 1152.
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attacks on this exercise of power have been customarily based on
the ground that the procedure deprives the owner concerned of
his property without due process of law. In overruling such contention the courts have customarily relied on a variety of reasons.
In Manhattan Manufacturing and Fertiliing Co. v. Van Kcurcnt1
a municipal officer investigated and found that the fertilizer factory of the plaintiff constituted a nuisance, and entered and sufficiently dismantled it to prevent its operation, when the owner
thereof failed to remedy the conditions complained of. in sustaining his action the court said:
"At common law it was always the right of a citizen, without
official authority to abate a public nuisance, and without waiting
to have it adjudged such by a legal tribunal. His right to do so
depended upon the fact of its being a nuisance. If he assumed
to act upon his own adjudication that it was, and such adjudication was afterwards shown to be wrong, he was liable as wrongdoer for his error, and appropriate damages could be recovered
against him. This common law right still exists in full force.
Any citizen, acting either as an individual or as a public official
under orders of local or municipal authorities, whether such order
be or be not in pursuance of special legislation or chartered provisions, may abate what the common law deemed a public nuisance. In abating it property may be destroyed, and the owner
deprived of it without trial, without notice, and without compensation. Such destruction for the public safety or health is not a
taking of private property for public use without compensation
or due process of law in the sense of the constitution. It is simply
the prevention of its noxious and unlawful use, and depends upon
the principles that every man must so use his property as not to
injure his neighbor, and that the safety of the public is the paramount law. These principles are legal maxims or axioms essential
to the existence of regulated society. Written constitutions presuppose them, and cannot set them aside. They underlie and
justify what is termed the police power of the state."
Again in Lowe v. Conroys2 a health officer destroyed certain
hides alleged to be infected with anthrax. In a suit against him
for damages the court sustained such procedure on the ground of
immediate public necessity, remarking:
"The statutes were unquestionably framed upon the fact that
such boards must act immediately and summarily in cases of the
appearance of contagious and malignant diseases, which are liable
to spread and become epidemic causing destruction of human life.
Under such circumstances it has been held that the legislature
81(1872) 23 N. J. Eq. 251.
82(1904) 120 Wis. 151, 97 N. W. 942.
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under its police power can rightfully grant to boards of health
authority to employ all necessary means to protect the public
health, and if necessary to go to the extent of destroying private
property when the emergency demands."'8 3
The courts have sustained administrative abatement not only
of property offensive to the senses or imminently dangerous to
the public health 8 ' but also of property infected with dangerous
animal and plant diseases8 3 and of artesian wells allowed by the
owner to run to waste to the detriment of other water users.8 On
the analogy of nuisance the administrative abatement of buildings
erected or improved contrary to law within the fire limits of a
city is'sustained, the courts frequently stressing the necessity for
immediate and summary action to prevent the always present
danger of fire ;87 and it has been held that administrative officials
may impound and sell for the charges animals unlawfully allowed
to stray on the public highways. 88 The quarantine of those infected with contagious diseases is properly committed to medical
83
1n the trial of this case the jury found that the hides were not in
fact infected with the result that the officer was held liable for the value
thereof. The award of damages was affirmed on appeal. In Miller v.
Horton, (1891) 152 Mass. 540, 26 N. E. 100 the court intimated strongly
that it was beyond the power of the state to make the administrative Ietermination final. See also Freund, The Police Power, sec. 521.
84
City of Orlando v. Pragg, (1893) 31 Fla. 111, 12 So. 368; Mayor,
etc., of Savannah v. Mulligan, (1895) 95 Ga. 323, 22 S. E. 621; City of
New Orleans v. Charaouleau, (1908) 121 La. 890, 46 So. 911.
85
Los Angeles County v. Spencer, (1899) 126 Cal. 670, 59 Pac. 202;
Rowland v. Morris, (1922) 152 Ga. 842, 111 S. E. 389. In Stockwell v.
State, (1920) 110 Tex. 550, 221 S. W. 932, the Texas supreme court held
unconstitutional a statute giving to the commissioner of agriculture authority
to order the abatement of trees and shrubs infested with contagious diseases
of citrus fruits, which statute made the decision of the commissioner filial.
The court held that while the state may declare a definite thing a nuisance
and order its destruction, if the statute defines the nuisance only in general
terms, the determination of whether a specific thing comes within those
terms involves the judicial function. "Under the contest made by his
pleading, before the property of the defendant could be summarily destroyed,
fie was entitled to a judicial hearing and decision as to whether it ought to
be destroyed. As applied to such a case, nothing less would amount to due
process of law, without which the bill of rights declares no citizen shall be
deprived of his property."
86
Eccles v. Ditto, (1917) 23 N. M. 235, 167 Pac. 726.
87McKibbin v. Fort Smith, (1880) 35 Ark. 352; King v. Davenport,
(1881) 98 Ill. 305; Eichenlaub v. City of St. Joseph, (1893) 113 Mo. 395,
21 S. W. 8; Russell v. City of Fargo, (1914) 28 N. D. 300, 148 N. W.
610; Davison v. Walla Walla, (1909) 52 Wash. 453, 100 Pac. 981. See,
however, Reagan v. City of Texarkana, (Tex. Civ. App. 1922) 238 S. W.
717.
88
Wilcox v. Hemming, (1883) 58 Wis. 144, 15 N. W. 435; contra,
Varden v. Mount, (1879) 78 Ky. 86.
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officials."' The administrative abatement of certain classes of
property, however, such as gambling devices, obscene pictures,
and intoxicating liquors, rests on the distinct principle that the
state may deprive such articles of their character as property,
and in them therefore the possessors can claim no legal rights
enforceable in the courts of lawY °
Granting that property of a certain kind is a nuisance the right
of administrative abatement seems clear, but the legislature has
no arbitrary power to declare property to be a nuisance and so
subject to summary destruction by executive officers.91 But
whether the right to declare property a nuisance is limited to those
cases where summary and immediate abatement is essential to the
preservation of public welfare or where the property has been
validly stripped of all legal status is perhaps uncertain.02
(3) Certain callings, such as railroads and the other public
service companies and commercial banks, are subject to an unusual
degree of public control, which in recent years has been invariably
committed to administrative commissions. Perhaps the most important function exercised by such commissions is the regulation
of the rates of the railroads and of the other public utilities. Concerning this function it is held that the fixing of a rate for the
future, though it involves the finding of facts and the application
and construction of law, is an act inherently legislative in character and so not subject to the objection that judicial power is
unlawfully conferred on an administrative body.03 Administrative
S9Haverty v. Bass, (1876)

66 Me. 71; Ex parte Lewis, (1931) 328
50 Idaho 673,
299 Pac. 668 and In re lain, (1933) 162 Okla. 65, 19 Pac. (2d) 153, the
court sustained orders by administrative agencies for the sterilization of
mental
defectives, where full judicial review was afforded.
90
Samuels v. McCurdy, (1925) 267 U. S. 188, 45 Sup. Ct. 264, 69 L
Ed. 568; Mullen v. Mosely, (1907) 13 Idaho 457, 90 Pac. 986; Board of
Police Commissioners v. Wagner, (1901) 93 Md. 182, 48 At. 455. It has
been held, however, that where the property has a legal use, it may not be
summarily destroyed because employed for illegal purposes. State v. Robbins, (1890) 124 Ind. 308, 24 N. E. 978. McConnell v. McKillip, (1904)
71 Neb. 712, 99 N. W. 505; State ex rel. Herigstad v. McCray, (1921)
48 N.91 D. 625, 186 N. W. 280; see Freund, The Police Power, sec. 527.
Yates v. Milwaukee, (1869) 10 Wall. (U.S.) 497, 19 L Ed. 984;
City 92of Acworth v. Western & A. R. Co., (1925) 159 Ga. 610, 126 S. F_. 454.
See Lawton v. Steele, (1894) 152 U. S. 133, 14 Sup. Ct. 499, 38 L.
Ed. 385 with dissent; Ieck v. Anderson, (1881) 57 Cal. 251; McConnell v.
McKillip, (1904) 71 Neb. 712, 99 N. W. 505; Freund, The Police Power,
sec. 93
520.
Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Garrett, (1913) 231 U. S. 298, 34 Sup.
Ct. 48, 58 L. Ed. 229; Oregon R_ & N. Co. v. Campbell, (C.C. Ore. 1909)
173 Fed. 957; Missouri Southern R Co. v. Public Service Commission,
(1919) 279 Mo. 484, 214 S. W. 379. The courts are not bothered by the

Mo. 843, 42 S. W. (2d) 21. in State v. Troutman, (1931)
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control includes, besides rate regulation, many other details of the
utility's relations with the public, such as the extent and character
of the service furnished, the construction and abandonment of
lines of railroad, the location of stations, the crossings and connections between the lines of different railroad companies, and
the proper protection of highway crossings. It seems settled that
such functions are administrative, and not judicial, in character.
In People ex rel. Hubbard v. Colorado Title & Trust Co.,0 4 the
court sustained the grant to the public utilities commission of
power to authorize the abandonment of a line of railroad, saying:
"The Public Utilities Commission is not a court, but is an
administrative commission, having certain delegated powers, and
charged with the performance of certain executive and administrative duties, and its powers are subject to the action of the
courts in matters of which the courts have jurisdiction. .

.

. The

power to ascertain from the facts whether a railroad company
should discontinue service upon and dismantle the road is delegated by the Legislature to a commission. . . This is not the
exercise of judicial power by a commission in the sense that courts
administer judicial remedies, but is incidental to the exercise of
delegated administrative powers. The exercise of judgment and
discretion as an incident to such power is not the exercise of
judicial power within the meaning of the Constitution.""0
Banking is another activity closely affecting the public and
subject to unusual supervision by administrative authorities. Concerning the activities of such executive agents it has been held
that the closing of banks, the operations of which are dangerous
to the public welfare, and the levying of assessments against the
stockholders of insolvent institutions are not so far judicial in
character that they may not be performed by administrative officers. 6
fact that this answer to the contention that judicial powers are unlawfully
conferred necessarily raises the problem of unlawful delegation of legislative
power. It is held, however, that due process of law is lacking if full court
review of the question of confiscation is not afforded. Ohio Valley Water
Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, (1920) 253 U. S. 287, 40 Sup. Ct. 527, 64 L.
Ed. 908.
94(1918) 65 Colo. 472, 178 Pac. 6.
95See also Railroad Commission v. Northern Alabama Ry., (1913)
182 Ala. 357, 62 So. 749; Alton and Southern Ry. v. Vandalia Ry., (1915)
268 I1l. 68, 108 N. E. 800; Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v. State, (1921) 82
Okla. 221, 200 Pac. 208; State v. St. L. S. W. Ry., (Tex. Civ. App. 1913)
165 S.W. 491; State ex rel. Ore.-Wash. R. & N. Co. v. Department of
Public Works, (1930) 155 Wash. 665, 286 Pac. 39; State ex rel. Northern
P. Ry. v. Railroad Commission, (1909) 140 Wis. 145, 121 N. W. 919;
Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Wisconsin Zinc Co., (1920) 172 Wis. 407,
179 N. W. 588.
96Cosmopolitan Trust Co. v. Mitchell, (1922) 242 Mass. 95, 136 N. E.
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5.

IMPOSITION OF PENALTIES AND FORFEITURES.

The infliction of punishment for the violation of law, particularly when it involves incarceration of the offender, is undoubtedly considered to be the peculiar prerogative of the courts.
In Wong Wing v. United States97 a federal statute gave to a
United States judge or court commissioner power, by summary
proceedings, not only to deport aliens unlawfully within the country but also to order their confinement at hard labor for one year
prior to the deportation. The court, while admitting that the
exclusion and deportation of aliens might lawfully be committed
to administrative agencies, held unconstitutional the attempt to
provide such proceedings in relation to punishment.
"To declare unlawful residence within the country to be an
infamous crime, punishable by deprivation of liberty and property,
would be to pass out of the sphere of constitutional legislation,
unless provision were made that the fact of guilt should first be
established by a judicial trial. It is not consistent with the theory
of our government that the legislature should, after having defined an offense as an infamous crime, find the fact of guilt, and
adjudge the punishment by one of its own agents."
Other statutes have also been held unconstitutional when the
court has seen in them attempts to impose on administrative
agencies the power to punish for crime. Thus the Illinois court
held that a so-called tax of $10 imposed on all land owners who
failed to clear certain streams on their lands of obstruction was
in reality a penalty which could not be imposed by the tax administrators,9 and in North Dakota a statute which directed the
secretary of state to revoke the charter of any corporation which,
in his opinion, was intentionally, for the purpose of destroying
competition, selling its merchandise at lower rates in one section
of the state than in others, was an unconstitutional attempt to inflict punishment through administrative process. 9
403; Felton v. Bennett, (1927) 163 Ga. 849, 137 S. E. 264; Allen v. Pruden-

tial Trust Co., (1922) 242 Mass. 78, 136 N. E. 410; Hanson v. Soderberg,
(1919) 105 Wash. 255, 177 Pac. 827. In Shaw v. Lone Star Bldg. & Loan
Association, (1931) 40 S.W. (2d) 968 the uniformly conservative Texas
court held that the state banking commissioner could not be invested with
power to annul the certificate of authority of a building and loan association

determined by him to be conducting its business in violation of law. "The
determination of these questions 'upon examination and other evidence' and
the imposition of the penalty, annulment of the permit to do business,
involve all elements of a judicial proceeding, and power, the exercise of
which the constitution has vested in the judiciary:'
917(1896) 163 U. S.228, 16 Sup. Ct 977, 41 L Ed. 140.
98
CIeveland, etc., R. v. People, (1904) 212 Ill. 638, 72 N. E. 725.
99
State v. Blaisdell, (1911) 22 N. D. 86, 132 N. W. 769. The court
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Nevertheless, in certain situations, in which the public interest
is particularly paramount, administrative imposition of penalties
for breaches of the law has been accepted with scarcely any protest. For a long time the tariff laws have provided that where
the appraised value of imported merchandise shall exceed by a
given percentage the declared value, additional duties by way of
penalty shall be assessed by the collector of customs. Concerning
this statute the Supreme Court of the United States in Passavant
v. United States said :10o
"As stated by Mr. Justice Campbell, speaking for the court,
in Bartlett v. Kane, . . . such additional duties 'are the compensation for a violated law, and are designed to operate as checks and
restraints upon fraud.' They are designed to discourage undervaluation upon imported merchandise, and to prevent efforts to
escape the legal rates of duty. It is wholly immaterial whether
they are called 'additional duties' or 'penalties.' Congress had
the power to impose them under either designation or character.
When the dutiable value of the merchandise is finally ascertained
to be in excess of the value declared in the entry by more than
10 per centum, this extra duty or penalty attaches, and the collector is directed and required to levy and collect the same in
addition to the ad valorem duty provided by law. The importers
in this case cannot be heard to complain of this additional duty
or penalty, which was a legal incident to the finding of a dutiable
value in excess of the entry value to the extent provided by the
statute."
The power of the commissioner of internal revenue to levy
additional assessments on account of negligent or fraudulent income tax returns" 1 seems not to have been challenged on constitutional grounds. The most extreme example of administrative
imposition of penalties occurs in the case of Oceanic Steam Navigation Company v. Stranahan,102 where the collector of customs
was empowered to impose a fine of $100 for each diseased alien
brought into the United States by a steamship company when
medical examination under the auspices of such officer disclosed
that the said company should have ascertained the fact of such
seemed to think that the particular vice in the statute was that the secretary
acted on his "opinion as to the intent or wilfulness of the relator." If he
had been required to act merely on the "finding of the simple fact that a
greater price is charged at one place than another under similar circumstances," a different question would have been presented. See also Bridge
Street etc. Road Co. v. Hogadone, (1908) 115 Mich. 638, 114 N. W. 917.
100(1893) 148 U. S. 157, 13 Sup. Ct. 572, 37 L. Ed. 404.
10
'Revenue Act 1932, sec. 293, 26 U. S. C. A. sec. 2293, Mason's UI. S.
Code tit. 26, sec. 2293.
102(1909) 214 U. S. 320, 29 Sup. Ct. 671, 53 L. Ed. 1013.
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disease at the time of embarkation. This administrative exercise
of the power to punish was sustained by a reliance on the plenary
power of Congress over foreign commerce. 03 Concerning this
formalistic approach to the subject sufficient has been said
04
already.
6.

SETTLEMENT OF CONTROVERSIES BETWEEN INDIVIDUALS.

The settlement of disputes between individual contestants is
the very raison d'8tre and primary occupation of the courts of
justice, and in the grant to administrative bodies of such functions
the greatest strain of all is placed upon the doctrine of the separation of powers. Professor Ernst Freund in his treatise, Administrative Powers over Persons and Property; 05 thought indeed such exercise of quasi-judicial powers by administrative
bodies so much of an anomaly that he refused to include them in
his treatment of the subject. Nevertheless, several very important instances of the grant of such powers to administrative
tribunals exist. The Interstate Commerce Act gives to the commission power to entertain complaints against carriers for damages suffered on account of violations of the act. The order of
the commission for reparation is, however, enforceable only by
action at law in the courts, where the findings and order of the
commission are prima facie evidence of the facts. 00 Similar provisions occur in many of the state utility laws. Back of these
grants of power lies undoubtedly the conviction that the control
over the railroads and other public utilities calls for the detailed
knowledge and training of expert administrative officials and that
this control should not be hanpered by theoretical divisions of the
powers of government. 0 7 In the leading case of Texas and Pacific
Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co.,108 the Supreme Court took the
position that one of the cardinal objects of the Interstate Commerce Act was to secure uniformity of rates and transportation
'03There is some conflict whether an administrative agency has the
power to punish for contempt witnesses who refuse to testify before it. See
Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brimson, (1894) 154 U. S. 447, 14
Sup. Ct. 1125, 38 L. Ed. 1047 dictum; Langenberg v. Decker, (1892) 131
Ind. 471, 31 N. E. 190; In re Sanford, (1911) 236 Mo. 665, 139 S. W. 376;
In re0 Hayes, (1931) 200 N. C. 133, 156 S. E. 791.
' 4See supra II, 3.
lOlFreund, Administrative Powers over Persons and Property, p. 12.
10649 U. S. C. A. secs. 13 and 16, 3 Mason's U. S. code tit. 49 sees.

13 and 16.
107See Great Northern Ry. v. Merchants Elevator Co., (1922)
U. S. 285, 42 Sup. Ct. 477, 66 L. Ed. 943.
8s(1907) 204 U. S. 426, 27 Sup. Ct. 350, 51 L. Ed. 553.

259

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

practices between carriers and shippers. It held, therefore, that
a shipper claiming to be injured by the illegal charges of a carrier
could not sue therefor in the courts until the validity or invalidity of the charges had been established before the Interstate
Commerce Commission.
While there have been numerous cases considering whether
or not administrative judgment and discretion is so involved in a
given case as to require resort to the commission before suit is
brought before the courts, 10 9 the determination of the class of
claims that can be entertained by the commission under its statutory power to award damages has not been so often considered.
Probably the best suggestion is that of an unusually well informed commentator, that the commission's power extends only
to those cases where the knowledge and judgment of experienced
technicians is required and not to those cases where the decision
depends only upon ordinary fact determinations and the application thereto of the rules of the common law. 110 In this respect
the case of Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Merchants Elevator Co."'
is instructive. In that case a shipper sued in a state suit to recover
freight charges exacted in alleged violation of the company's
tariffs. The decision turned on a proper construction of these
tariffs, and it was contended that in order to secure uniformity
under the principle of the Abilene Case prior resort should be had
to the commission. The court, however, denied the argument saying that resort to the commission is required in those cases where
the determination of the controversy demands "acquaintance with
the many intricate facts of transportation . . . commonly to be

found only in a body of experts." In the instant case, if the interpretation of the tariff had involved the question whether particular terms therein employed had been used in a general or in
a special trade sense, it would have been necessary to have secured
first the expert decision of the commission; but since the only
question was the ordinary one of law, viz., the proper construction
to be placed on a written document, the courts had the primary
1'0 Penn. R. v. Puritan 'Coal Mining Co., (1915) 237 U. S. 121, 35 Sup.
Ct. 484, 59 L. Ed. 867; Illinois Central R. v. Mulberry Hill Coal Co.,
(1915) 238 U. S. 275, 35 Sup. Ct. 760, 59 L. Ed. 1306; Penn. R. R. Co.
v. Clark Bros. Coal Mining Co., (1915) 238 U. S. 456, 35 Sup. Ct. 896,
59 L. Ed. 1406; Great N. Ry. Co. v. Merchants Elevator Co., (1922) 259
U. S. 285, 42 Sup. Ct. 477, 66 L. Ed. 943.
1"0 Fletcher, Power of the Interstate Commerce Commission to Award
Damages, (1916) 25 Yale L. J. 489.
111(1922) 259 U. S. 285, 42 Sup. Ct. 477, 66 L. Ed. 943.
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jurisdiction. It is this difference between those controversies
which involve detailed knowledge of utility law and practices and
those which require only ordinary fact determinations and the
application of the ordinary rules of law that seems to decide, not
only in Interstate Commerce Commission cases,'2 but also in
cases arising under the state utility laws, whether the commissions
or the courts should have jurisdiction.11

3

The commission's power

of reparation being thus limited, the courts have found but little
constitutional difficulty with the statutes, since they do not pretend to give the commission any enforcement power but require
court action to collect the award in which the proceedings before
the commission constitute prima facide evidence only of the right
to the award.114
112Blume & Co. v. Wells-Fargo, (1909) 15 I. C. C. Rep. 53; Gustafson
v. Mich. Cent R. Co., (1921) 296 Ill. 41, 129 N. E. 516; Louisville & N. R.
Co. v. Scott, (1909) 133 Ky. 724, 118 S. W. 990.
lsIn Waukesha G. & E. Co. v. Waukesha Motor Co., (1921) 175 Wis.
420, 184 N. W. 702, the plaintiff utility sued for gas and electricity furnished
the defendant. The defendant counterclaimed for breach of the plaintiff's
contract to furnish certain specified amounts of gas and electricity each
month. The Wisconsin supreme court held that the matter of this counter
claim was for the courts and not for the commission, since the only question
involved was the simple question of breach of contract, wherein the technical
knowledge of the commission could be of no assistance. In Chicago, M. &
St. P. Ry. Co. v. R. I Commission, (1927) 194 Wis. 24, 215 N. W. 442,
the Monad Construction Co. had become indebted to the plaintiff railroad
for demurrage charges. The plaintiff had in its filed tariffs a certain
average demurrage plan in which credit was given to the shipper for
prompt return of cars. The railroad company refused to enter into such
average demurrage agreement with the Monad Co., on account of the past
unpaid demurrage, and made demand on the shipper for demurrage on the
straight basis. It was held that this was a matter within the proper jurisdiction of the Commission. The Waukesha G. & E. Case involved mere
breach of contract, whereas in this case the violation of statutory rules was
involved. See also Jones v. Cooper, (1922) 154 Ark. 308, 242 S.W. 550.
114Meeker v. Lehigh Valley Ry. Co., (1915) 236 U. S. 412, 35 Sup.
Ct. 328, 59 L. Ed. 644; Sullivan v. Union Stockyards Co., (C.C.A. 8th Cir.
1928) 26 F. (2d) 60; State v. Public Service Comm., (1932) 135 Kan.
491, 11 Pac. (2d) 999; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Greenbrier Distillery Co.,
(1916) 170 Ky. 775, 187 S. W. 296; Turner Creamery Co. v. Chicago, M.
& St. P. Ry., (1915) 36 S.D. 310, 154 N. W. 819; Chicago & N. V. Ry.
v. Railroad Comm., (1914) 156 Wis. 47, 145 N. W. 216. In State ex rel.
Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., (1917) 94 Wash. 274, 162
Pac. 523, where the commission attempted to make a final award of damages,
it was held an unconstitutional delegation of judicial power existed. In
State ex rel. Mo. Pac. R. IR Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., (1924) 303 Mo.
212, 259 S. W. 445, the Missouri supreme court held that the power of
the Public Service Commission to decide claims of shippers against railroads was an unconstitutional grant of judicial power. "To determine
whether one person is entitled to recover money from another by way of
damages cannot be anything but a judicial question and as such must be
determined by the courts. The Public Service Commission is not, and
under our constitution cannot be, a court. . . .A statute authorizing such
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(2) Two major attempts have been made to subject to administrative determination controversies over land titles. To inaugurate the so-called Torrens system of land registration, the
Illinois legislature provided that application for a certificate of
title should be made to the recorder of deeds, who, after notice to
possible adverse claimants, should proceed to have the title to the
land examined, and upon satisfying himself of the right of the
petitioner, should issue to him a certificate of title. This certificate
should constitute conclusive evidence of the holder's rights, except
that those claiming an adverse interest in the land should have
five years from the date of the certificate to bring action in the
regular courts of law to assert their adverse claims. In spite of
this right of judicial review, the statute was held an illegal delegation of judicial power." 5 State v. Guilbert11 involved that portion of the Ohio Torrens law which gave the recorder of deeds,
upon petition of the mortgagor, authority to discharge, after
notice to the mortgagee, liens upon the land for which no satisfaction had been filed, although an appeal might be made to the courts
from the decision of the recorder. The court again held that this
determination by an administrative officer of the rights of the
parties was an unconstitutional exercise of judicial power.
A more determined effort to provide administrative means
for the settlement of land controversies has been made in connection with conflicting water rights in the arid states of the west,
where the doctrine of prior appropriation prevails. Concerning
the relative efficiency of judicial and administrative adjudication
of these claims the Wyoming court has remarked:
"In the development of the irrigation problem under the rule
of prior appropriation, perplexing questions are continually arising, of a technical and practical character. As between an investigation in the courts and by the board, it would seem that an
administrative board, with experience and peculiar knowledge
along this particular line, can, in the first instance, solve the questions involved, with due regard to private and public interests,
conduct the requisite investigation, and make the ascertainment
of individual rights, with greater facility, at less expense to interested parties, and with a larger degree of satisfaction to all concerned."'
a body to make a finding in a case like this, whether the finding was to be
final or merely prima facie evidence, is void."
115People ex rel. Kern v. Chase, (1896) 165 II1. 527, 46 N. E. 454.
See supra, p. 273, for quotations from this case.
116(1897) 56 Ohio St. 575, 47 N. E. 551. See supra, p. 272.
117Farm Investment Co. v. Carpenter, (1900) 9 Wyo. 110, 61 Pac. 258.
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The Wyoming law, which forms the basis for the statutes of
Nebraska, Texas, and Nevada, provides for a board of water control which, on its own motion, is to proceed to determine after
investigation and hearing the respective priorities of the claimants
to the public Waters of the state. Appeal is permitted to the
courts, but, in absence of such, the order of the board, recordable
in the county court as a certificate of title, is conclusively determinative of the rights of the respective users. Concerning the
contention that judicial power is unlawfully delegated to the board,
the Wyoming court said:
"The statute nowhere attempts to devest the courts of any
jurisdiction granted to them by the constitution to redress grievances and afford relief at law or in equity under the ordinary and
well-known rules of procedure. A purely statutory proceeding
is created, to be set in motion by no act or complaint of any injured party, but which in each instance is to be inaugurated by
order of the board,--a proceeding which is to result, not in a
judgment for damages to a party for injuries sustained, nor the
issuance of any writ or process known to the law for the purpose
of preventing the unlavful invasion of a party's rights or privileges; but the finality of the proceeding is a settlement or adjustment of the priorities of appropriation of the public waters of the
state, and is followed by the issuance of a certificate to each appropriator, showing his relative standing among other claimants,
and the amount of water to which he is found to be entitled."
A similar result was reached in the neighboring state of Nebraska, -'8 but in Texas and Nevada the law in question was held
9
invalid. In Board of Water Engineers v. McKnight,"1
the
Texas court said:
"In order to make the determinations required of the Board
of Water Engineers in Texas, they must decide the most intricate
questions of law and of fact-questions with respect to the validity
and superiority of land titles, questions of contract, questions of
boundary, questions of limitations, and questions of prescription.
An inquiry involving such questions and resulting in the binding
adjudication of property rights is strictly judicial, and we would
not uphold the Constitution as it is plainly written were we to
sanction the delegation of the power to conduct and to finally
See also Cox, The Texas Board of Water Engineers, (1928) 7 Tex. L.
Rev. 86, 245.

"isCrawford v. Hathaway, (1903) 67 Neb. 325, 93 N. W. 781; Farmers
Irrigation District v. Frank, (1904) 72 Neb. 136, 100 N. W. 286; Enterprise Irrigation District v. Tri-state Land Co., (1912)

N. W. 171.

119(1921)

111 Tex. 82, 229 S. W. 301.

discussion of this case.

92 Neb. 121, 138

See supra p. 273 for further
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determine such an inquiry to any
courts.

other tribunal

than

the

...
120

The Oregon and Arizona statutes differ slightly from those
just mentioned in that the order of the board is not of itself determinative of the rights of the parties but must first be filed in
the circuit court, which court, if no objection is made to the
board's findings, enters judgment in accordance therewith, but if
objection is made, proceeds to determine the rights of the parties
in a manner which "shall be as nearly as may be like that in a
suit of equity." These statutes have been upheld, the Oregon
court saying:
"In proceedings under the statute the board is not authorized
to make determinations which are final in character. Their findings and orders are prima facie final and binding until changed
in some proper proceeding. The findings of the board are advisory rather than authoritative. It is only when the courts of
the state have obtained jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of
the persons interested and rendered a decree in the matter determining such rights that, strictly speaking, an adjudication or
final determination is made."12
(3) In conferring upon industrial commissions and similar
boards the power to determine the claims of employees for injuries arising under the provisions of the workmen's compensation laws we find by far the most important instance of the delegation to administrative agencies of quasi-judicial power. Although the compensation laws extend the liability of the employer
far beyond the original limits of the common law, nevertheless
both under the commission administration of the statutory rules
and the court administration of the common law rule the essential
question to be answered is the same: Is the employer liable to
his employee under the particular rules applicable to the case for
an injury to the latter occurring in the course of his employment?
It should be noticed also that the controversy at issue is essentially
a private one between individual persons, the public right being
12OSee Cox, supra n. 117, for a complete discussion of the situation in
Texas, and Ormsby County v. Kearney, (1914) 37 Nev. 314, 142 Pac. 803,
inwhich the Nevada court by a two to one decision held their act unconstitutional. As far as the statutes provided for the licensing or the
appropriation of the unused public waters of the state, the statute was upheld, even though the determination of the board that unappropriated waters
existed would seem to involve the vested rights of prior appropriators.
See Motl v. Boyd, (1926) 116 Tex. 82, 286 S. W. 458; Speer v. Stephenson,
(1909) 1 16 Idaho 707, 102 Pac. 365.
74 Or. 592, 144 Pac. 505. See accord
.12 In re Willow Creek, (1914)
Stuart v. Norviel, (1924) 26 Ariz. 493, 226 Pac. 908.
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involved only to the extent that the state is perhaps unusually
interested in the welfare of its laboring classes.1 22- Nevertheless,
in spite of this strong resemblance to the ordinary judicial function, the delegation to commissions of the power to decide claims
under the workmen's compensation statutes has been uniformly
sustained, but for a variety of reasons.
The elective acts can be easily disposed of on the ground that
the parties have voluntarily chosen to accept commission adjudication of their respective claims. "The act being elective it is
operative only as to those who choose to come within its terms,
and in administering the act the commission becomes a board of
arbitration by agreement." 2 3 When this escape from the constitutional question is either not available or not resorted to, the
reasons given for upholding the delegation of this quasi-judicial
power to the commissions do not possess the above logical decisiveness. At times the court depends upon its own ipse dixit
that the power of the board is only administrative and not
judicial, 24 or upon the non-conclusive assertion that the determination of fact questions and the exercise of discretion are not
exclusive attributes of the courts but inhere also in the duties of
many executive officers and boards. 25 The assertion of one court
22
1- 1n some states a state fund is created to which injured employees are
relegated to claims for injuries arising in the course of their employment.
Since resort to this fund is in lieu of the right existing at common law to
sue the employer for damages, it could hardly be contended that the state
has the same arbitrary right to control expenditures from this fund as it
does in respect to claims against the state which are granted purely as a
matter23 of grace. See supra, I. C.
Oren v. Swift, (1932) 330 Mo. 869, 51 S. W. (2d) 59. See also
Mackin v. Detroit-Timkin Axle Co., (1915) 187 Mich. 8, 153 N .W. 49;
De May v. Liberty Foundry Co., (1931) 327 Mo. 495, 37 S. W. (2d) 640;

State ex rel. Yaple v. Creamer, (1912) 85 Ohio St. 349, 97 N. E. 602.
124The act "vests no judicial power in the industrial accident board
which it creates. That board is but an administrative agency provided for
the proper execution of the act." Middleton v. Tex. P. & L. Co., (1916)
108 Tex. 96, 185 S. W. 556. See also Fassig v. State ex rel. Turner,
(1917) 95 Ohio St. 232, 116 N. E. 104.
12 5AIabam's Freight Co. v. Hunt, (1926) 29 Ariz. 419, 242 Pac. 658;
Solvuca v. Ryan & Reilly Co., (1917) 131 Md. 265, 101 N. E. 710; Mackin
v. Detroit-Timkln Axle Co., (1915) 187 Mich. 8, 153 N. W. 49; Utah Fuel
Co. v. Industrial Commission, (1920) 57 Utah 246, 194 Pac. 122; Borgnis
v. Falk, (1911) 147 Wis. 327, 133 N. W. 209. In the last case cited the
court said:
"We do not consider the industrial commission a court,- nor do we
construe the act as vesting in the Commission judicial powers within the
meaning of the constitution. It is an administrative body or arm of the
government which in the course of its administration of a law is empowered
to ascertain some questions of fact and apply the existing law thereto, and
in so doing acts quasi-judicially, but it is not thereby vested with judicial
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that the acts of the compensation boards are administrative and
not judicial because "the act is almost automatic in practical working, amounts to be paid are easy of computation, and the person
or persons to whom they shall be paid are fixed and certain"'"
certainly will not be agreed to by any one who is cognizant of the
difficulties arising in the administration of the compensation laws.
A more common ground for denying the contention that judicial
powers are conferred on the compensation commissions is the
instance that such boards possess no powers of enforcing their
own decrees, 127 or else that they are not wholly binding on the
parties due to a more or less limited power of review by the
regularly constituted courts. Thus in the leading case of Borgnis
v. Falk128 the court held that the retention by the courts of the
power to decide whether a particular case came within the commission's jurisdiction as constituting a claim for compensation
against an employer by an employee who had elected to come
under the act, for accidental injury, growing out of or incidental
to the employment, and not due to wilful conduct, saved the
statute from being an unconstitutional delegation of judicial
power. 12' Reference has already been made to the fact that this
limited right of judicial review leaves to the administrative body
the final decision on many of the most important issues between
power in the constitutional sense. There are many such administrative
bodies or commissions, and with the increasing complexity of modern government they seem likely to increase rather than diminish. Examples may
be easily thought of,-town boards, boards of health, boards of review,
boards of equalization, railroad rate commissions, and public utility coinmissions all come within this class. They perform very important duties
in our scheme of government, but they are not legislatures or courts. The
legislative branch of the government by statute determines the rights, duties,
and liabilities of persons and corporations under certain conditions of fact,
and varying as the facts and conditions change. .

.

. The law is made by

the legislature; the facts upon which its operation is dependent are ascertained by the administrative board." For the weakness of this line of
reasoning
see supra, p. 266.
126 Grand Trunk Western R. R. Co. v. Industrial Commission. (1920)
291 I11.167, 125 N. E. 748. See also Cunningham v. Northwest Improvement 27Co., (1911) 44 Mont. 180, 119 Pac. 554.
1 Mackin v. Detroit-Timkin Axle Co., (1915) 187 Mich. 8, 153 N. W.
49. The industrial accident board is "but an administrative body vested, it
is true, with various and important duties and powers, some of them quasijudicial in their nature, but without that final authority to decide and
render enforceable judgment which constitutes the judicial power. Its determinations and awards are not enforceable by execution or other process
until a binding judgment is entered thereon in a regularly constituted court."
128(1911) 147 Wis. 327, 133 N. W. 209.

129 See also Alabam's Freight Co. v. Hunt, (1926) 29 Ariz. 419, 242
Pac. 658; State ex rel. Yaple v. Creamer, (1912) 85 Ohio St. 349, 97 N. E.
602.
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the parties and places but little restriction on the practical substitution of administrative for court adjudication.'
The most realistic solution to the workmen's compensation
cases is based on the police power of the state which has sufficient
vigor not only to sustain in matters of industrial accidents the
substitution of a rule of absolute liability for the old doctrine
based on fault, but also administrative determination of liability
for that of the slower and more cumbersome methods of the courts.
In State v. Mountain Timber Co., 131 the court said:
"When we say that we sustain a law by reference to the police
power that might otherwise be in conflict with some provision of
the constitution, it would seem that every incident to that law,
as well as all methods necessary to make it effective, are likewise
exempted from the proscriptions and limitations of the constitution. The legislature has adopted the idea of industrial insurance, and seen fit to make that idea a workable one by putting
its execution, as well as its administrative features, in the hands of
a commission. It has abolished rights of actions and defenses
and in certain cases denied the right of trial by jury. The legislature
has said to the man whose business is a dangerous one and the
operation of which may bring injury to an employee, that he cannot do business without waiving certain rights and privileges heretofore enjoyed, and it has said to the employee that, inasmuch as
he may become dependent upon the state, he must give up
his personal right of contract when about to engage in a hazardous
occupation and contract with reference to the law. These demands are the fundamentals of our industrial insurance law. If
the law is not administered as therein provided, it is not likely
that a compulsory law such as it is could ever be adequately administered; for, aside from its humane purpose, it was adopted
in order that the delay and frequent injustice incident to civil
trials might be avoided. .

.

. To uphold the law in the sense of

sustaining the idea of industrial insurance, and to deny the right
of executing it without the intervention of the courts, would throw
us back on the original ground and we should then, if consistent,
hold the idea of
industrial insurance to be beyond the limit of the
13

police power." '
1aOSee supra, p. 274.
131(1913) 75 Wash. 581, 135 Pac. 645.
132 See also Solvuca v. Ryan & Reilly Co., (1917) 131 Md. 265, 101
N. E. 710.
In Western Metal Supply Co. v. Pillsbury, (1916) 172 Cal. 407, 156
Pac. 491, the California supreme court, by reason of a constitutional amendment authorizing the legislature to provide administrative settlement of
compensation claims, was not required to resort to subtleties to sustain the
compensation act and was quite emphatic in its declaration that "this action
by such board would be an exercise of judicial power. For that purpose
it is in legal effect a court."
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III

From the foregoing somewhat lengthy discussion of the cases
it appears that a reasonable and persistent public demand for
tribunals and machinery better equipped than are the customary
courts to handle in a speedy, economical, and efficient manner
certain phases of legal controversy has met, and probably will
meet, with but little effective constitutional resistance. On one
ground or another the overwhelming majority of opinions sustain the delegation in the particular case that happens to be before
the court. There is no line of sufficient clarity effectively to differentiate the judicial and the administrative functions and so to
place them in their proper respective departments. Administrative bodies have been given powers to decide controversies between
the state and individuals and even between private disputants,
which are nevertheless held to be non-judicial in character as long
as the power of enforcement is left with the courts and a modicunl
of judicial review is still available. As has been seen," ' the
power to grant and revoke licenses has been held a proper administrative function. It seems likely that through this medium of
the administrative license government will assume an increasingly
greater control over what we formerly considered the private
prerogatives of business and industry.'3 4 The result in the western
water and in the workmen's compensation cases' 3 5 indicates that,
even in the case of essentially private controversies, adninistrative tribunals and methods may be provided if such recourse seems
necessary to secure prompt and efficient justice. The declaration
that the police power is capable not only of imposing new substantive standards but also of providing machinery to make the
enforcement of those standards effective'3 6 has possibilities of
future developments by no means exhausted. It is not now necessary to ascertain with exactness the extent to which the system
of administrative justice may constitutionally proceed. For present purposes it is sufficient to say that the system has established
its right to a place in our governmental structure and that the
end is not yet in sight.
The present predominance of the question of the constitutional
rights of administrative agencies to exist has led in many ways
33
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Sec. 4 (b) of the National Industrial Recovery Act, Supplement
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to gross anachronisms and injustices. Professor Patterson has
shown that the administrative control over the insurance business
is singularly lacking in the fundamentals of the judicial process,""
and the administration of the laws concerning the admission and
expulsion of aliens approaches a national scandal.' 3 The degree
of judicial review of administrative action now available leaves
on the one hand a large amount of judicial power in the hands
of the executive 3 9 and on the other is frequently criticized as an
officious interference with the administrative process."" It is a
reproach to Anglo-American justice that a competent American
observer can declare of France and of French administrative law
that "there is no other country where the rights of private individuals are so well protected against the arbitrariness, the abuses,
and the illegal conduct of the administrative authorities."1"1
Administrative law has indeed been sharply and severely criticised as an alien and dangerous innovation."12 It is, however,
strongly urged that those who are genuinely concerned would
render a much greater service if they would abandon their vain
attempts to sweep back the tides of administrative law and would
concentrate their attention to preserving in that system the really
fundamental ideals and principles of justice that the centuries
have enshrined in the jurisprudence and procedure of our customary courts. In spite of the virtual overthrow of the doctrine
that would forbid the delegation of judicial duties to other bodies
than the regularly constituted courts, it is believed that the courts
137Patterson,
The Insurance Commissioner in the United States, chap. 5.
38
1 The Enforcement of the Deportation Laws in the United States,

Report no. 5, National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement;

Clark, Deportation of Aliens from the United States; Van Vleck, The Ad-

ministrative Control of Aliens.
'39See supra, p. 274.

14oSee the criticisms of the cases of Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben
Avon Borough, (1920) 253 -U. S. 287, 40 Sup. Ct. 527, 64 L. Ed. 908, and
of Crowell v. Benson, (1932) 285 U. S. 22, 52 Sup. Ct. 285, 76 L Ed.
598; Albertsworth, Judicial Review of Administrative Action, (1921) 35
Harv. L. Rev. 127; Brown, The Functions of Courts and Commissions,
(1924) 38 Harv. L. Rev. 141; Dickinson, Judicial Review of "Constitutional
Fact," (1932) 80 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 1055; Hardman, Judicial Review as
Requirement of Due Process in Rate Regulation, (1921) 30 Yale L. J. 681.
4
' 'Garner, French Administrative Law, (1924) 33 Yale L. J. 597.
2
'14 See Sutherland, Private Rights and Governmental Control, (1918)
85 Cent. L. J. 168; Allen, Bureaucracy Triumphant; The Rt. Hon. Lord
Hewart of Bury, The New Despotism; Kidd, Encroachment of Administrative Bodies on the Judicial Sphere, (1929) 45 Scot. L Rev. 325. A somewhat extensive survey by the author of the views of the Wisconsin Bar
reveals a widespread hostility among the lawyers of the state to commissions and commission methods.
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of law as we know them in the Anglo-American system have in
their organization, procedure, and tradition, along with much that
is unnecessary and outmoded, the elements which secure the fair
and impartial justice which is a necessary attribute of every
enlightened government.
In a thoughtful and thorough treatise 1 43 Mr. W. A. Robson
of the English Bar discusses those elements of organization, procedure, and judicial thought technique by which the English
attempt to preserve the quality of justice dispensed by their courts.
This is not the place to consider how many of these elements
should be incorporated into a system of administrative justice.
Unfortunately, some of the features that are most important in
securing for the courts their vaunted impartiality cause their proceedings to be cumbersome, over-technical, and expensive. In
creating administrative tribunals we are too often prone to rush
to the other extreme and pay little or no attention to the fundamentals of organization and procedure by which the purity of the
judicial process is preserved. This neglect of the details of administrative organization and process should not continue. We must
pay more attention to the legislation by which administrative
tribunals are created and their procedures regulated, and to the
judicial rules promulgated for their guidance. 44 We must continue with the objective studies of different administrative tribunals for the conduct of which Professor Frankfurter with the
aid of the Commonwealth Fund has been so valiant a proponent
and patron 1 45 and be ready to apply the lessons revealed by such
studies. Perhaps such specialized tribunals as the Court of Claims,
the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals,1'" and the Board of
t 43

Robson, Justice and Administrative Law.
is unfortunate that the monumental case book on Administrative
Law by Professors Frankfurter and Davison concentrates to such an extent
on the separation of powers and the right to judicial review and almost
completely ignores the considerable body of law relating to the administrative process
itself.
145See Frankfurter, The Task of Administrative Law, (1927) 75 U.
of Pa. L. Rev. 614; Henderson, The Federal Trade Commission; Patterson,
The Insurance Commissioner in the United States; Van Vleck, Administrative Control of Aliens. In the collection of cases by Professor Frankfurter
and Professor Davison on Administrative Law, there is contained in the
appendix a long list of such studies made in connection with Professor
Frankfurter's seminar on Administrative Law at the Harvard Law School.
At the present time an extensive study of the administration of workmen's
compensation laws of the United States under Professor Walter F. Dodd
is just approaching completion.
'46See Ex parte Bakelite Corp., (1929) 279 U. S. 438, 49 Sup. Ct.
411, 73 L. Ed. 789; Fenning, Court of Customs and Patent Office Appeals.
(1931) 17 Am. Bar Ass'n J. 323.
44
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Tax Appeals, 4 7 lying on the border line between the judicial and
the administrative, are worthy of more widespread emulation. It
may be that a thorough comparative study of the French system
of administrative courts would reveal much that could with profit
be applied to ourselves.14

All this is, however, far beyond the

scope of the present article, and is merely indicative of the course
which it is believed the study of administrative law should in the
future follow.
147See Latham, Jurisdiction of the U. S. Board of Tax Appeals, (1927)
15 Cal.8 L. Rev. 199.
14 See Garner, French Administrative Law, (1924) 33 Yale L. J. 597;
Port, Administrative Law, chap. 7 and p. 349; Rosenberry, Administrative
Law and the Constitution, (1929) 23 Am. Pol. Sc. Rev. 32, 43.

